The Polis

Volume Two

EDITORS
Noam Josse '17
David Tanner '18

FACULTY ADVISOR
Dr. Seth Taylor
Principal for General Studies

The Polis

The Centennial Series:
Volume Two

Editors:
Noam Josse ('17)
and
David Tanner ('18)

Faculty Advisor:
Dr. Seth Taylor
Principal for General Studies, YUHSB

CONTENTS

Introduction

Rabbi Josh Kahn

Jews have often been referred to as the "People of the Book." This description is most fitting as it describes our commitment to learning and scholarship, which has been our life force throughout history. Fittingly, upon leaving Egypt and becoming a nation, we are presented with the ultimate "book"—our Holy Torah. If we are a people of the book, it is our commitment to continuing to learn, despite challenging situations, that has kept us alive and strong as a nation and community.

Famously, Rabbi Akiva, living under the Roman persecution in the second century, risked his life in order to teach Torah. The Gemara (*Berachot* 61b) records a story in which Papus ben Yehuda asked Rabbi Akiva why he was risking his life in order to teach Torah. Rabbi Akiva responded with a parable describing a fox walking on the bank of the river. The fox saw a school of fish swimming away from fishermen who were trying to catch them. Seeing this opportunity to outsmart the fish, the fox said to the fish that they should come to him on the bank of the river and he will protect them from the fishermen. The fish, puzzled by this suggestion from the fox, explain that in the water there is a chance they may be caught by the fishermen but also a possibility that they will survive. Outside of the water, they do not stand a chance of survival. Using this parable, Rabbi Akiva explained that there was a possibility the Romans would catch him and put him to death, but there was also a chance he would survive. Without Torah (water in the parable—indeed Torah

is often compared to water), survival would be impossible.

On Tisha B'Av, in the midst of the *kinnot* describing the destruction of the Beit Hamikdash and the great Jewish leaders who were murdered, we also read a *kinnah* that describes the burning of *sefarim* during the time of the Maharam Mi'Rotenberg in the year 1242. How tragic is the loss of our precious *sefarim,* our holy books!

Heinrich Heine, the 18th century German poet, said, "Whenever they burn books, they will also, in the end, burn human beings." Without books and learning, there can be no humanity! Heine further refers to the Torah as the Jewish "portable homeland," recognizing the role of learning as providing continued vitality for our national existence. This recognition of learning and scholarship as the bedrock of society, uniquely so for a yeshiva community, fuels the idea behind this prestigious publication, The Polis.

Arbitration Agreements:
A Problem That Can Become a Solution

David Tanner ('18)

In this day and age, everyone seems to be in agreement. Every time an iPhone is purchased or a website is browsed, the user and the provider of the service or product are engaging in a legally binding agreement, usually delineated in a "Terms of Service" or similarly named contract. If the user is happy with his/her service, s/he may not even be aware of the legal ramifications associated with the use of the service. It has become standard for people to click "Agree" to the terms of service proposed when a new technological device is purchased without reading the terms. In fact, the phenomenon of users not reading the legal agreements they are agreeing to is so common that comedian and political commentator John Oliver has provocatively suggested that "Apple could put the entire text of 'Mein Kampf' inside the iTunes user agreement, and you'd just go agree, agree, agree—what?—agree, agree."[1] It seems that for most people, the system leaves them alone and they leave it alone, and everyone is satisfied.

But the point of agreements is to plan for disagreements. Terms of service contracts delineate the legal ramifications associated with use of the service, often protecting the provider from legal action against them. One way in which companies protect themselves has grown increasingly popular over the last few years: arbitration.

On February 12th, 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). This introduced into law the concept of binding arbitration: out of court reconciliation of disagreements which were agreed upon by both parties. Instead of going to court, now people could sign an agreement to go to an arbitration panel unregulated by the government in case of dispute. Such an agreement is usually legally binding and enforceable by the courts, even if one of the parties wishes to abrogate the agreement after-the-fact and go to court instead. Many companies now include a short clause in their terms of use contract binding the user to go to an arbitration panel in case of dispute.

There are a few reasons why resolution through arbitration would be preferable in some cases to a lawsuit. Arbitration is less formal, leaving greater room for compromise than a lawsuit. In certain cases, arbitration may be quicker and cheaper as well. Another claimed benefit of arbitration is that if companies spend less money on legal fees than they would in the court system, they can pass on those savings in the way of cheaper consumer prices.[2] However, arbitration is only mutually beneficial if both sides desire and voluntarily agree to use it. The problematic type of arbitration is forced arbitration, where companies refuse to make their services or products available unless a consumer agrees beforehand "to waive their right to sue, to participate in a class action lawsuit, or to appeal," according to the website of the National Association of Consumer Advocates. Mandatory arbitration has surged in popularity among large companies in the past few decades, and it has caused an overwhelmingly negative effect for consumers.

The main downside for individuals in arbitration is the ban on class action lawsuits. Class action lawsuits allow many people to sue together rather than individually. The advantage to this is mainly in the case of lawsuits over a small amount of money, for which a lawsuit by one individual wouldn't be worth it because the legal fees outweigh the potential money won; when many people group together and are represented by one lawyer the fees are distributed across the total winnings, allowing a lawsuit that was previously unrealistically expensive to have minimal cost to each person. However, class actions are far from perfect, because the lawyer typically takes so much of the settlement money that the people wronged receive a mere pittance for their

troubles. But it must be said that class actions do give people a voice against large companies with far superior resources by allowing them to challenge even small wrongdoings. In arbitration, plaintiffs must fend for themselves and individually provide the legal fees that arbitrators require to consider a case. Even though these fees are sometimes cheaper than the costs of litigation, plaintiffs must shoulder the costs alone in all cases of arbitration. Usually the fees are split evenly between the plaintiff and the defendant. But when individuals who feel they have been wronged of tens or hundreds of dollars encounter costs of thousands of dollars for arbitration, they simply accept the loss and move on.

A second major disadvantage to arbitration is that it is final: unlike the state and federal court systems, there is no possibility of appealing an arbitrator's ruling.[3] Another disadvantage to the arbitration system is its lack of oversight. There are arbitration companies with good reputations, such as the American Arbitration Association, but companies do not always specify which arbitration organization they will go to, leading to occasional cases where the arbitrators are interested parties themselves.[4] There is a subtle bias influencing arbitrators to rule in favor of companies: the simple fact that arbitration organizations compete. If a company does not like the ruling of an arbitration panel, it may well start going to another one, causing a tremendous loss to the first arbitration panel, which has now lost its business with that company.[5] In short, arbitration discourages individuals from starting a fight with companies because they feel the odds are against them and because they lack the resources and the motivation to do so successfully.

The Supreme Court has enforced bans on class action suits included in arbitration clauses. For the most part, even forced arbitration has been classified as legal under the FAA and court challenges to it have been unsuccessful, with some notable exceptions. In *Chavarria v. Ralphs,* the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a California law considering any "unconscionable" contract unenforceable and allowed the application of this law to compulsory arbitration, saying that any job offered "on a take-it-or-leave-it basis" (where if the employee refuses the arbitration clause, s/he may not take the job) is unconscionable under California law. The Court further held that such a policy is

not out of line with the Federal Arbitration Act, because the FAA only prohibits laws specifically targeting arbitration, and the California's contract unconscionability law applies equally to agreements without arbitration. This is encouraging news, as it shows that one can be against forced arbitration without necessarily being against the FAA or arbitration as a whole.

One notable rule that goes against the precedent of allowing forced arbitration is the recently released regulation of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), a federal agency, regarding binding arbitration. The National Law Review website reported new regulations banning any binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements between nursing home facilities and residents. In other words, nursing homes may not require residents to sign arbitration agreements to be admitted to the facility, but can only consider arbitration after a dispute occurs. While it goes against the trend of previous Supreme Court rulings and has been legally challenged, the new regulations are a good idea. In such a crucial area of society, where horror stories about nursing home residents being abused have unfortunately been heard, it is inconceivable that those wronged should not be able to take their case to a court with oversight whose decision can be examined and challenged. That doesn't necessarily mean that any pre-dispute agreements must be banned, but mandatory arbitration certainly has no place in healthcare.

Another interesting perspective within arbitration is the status of a *beit din,* or Jewish rabbinical court, as an arbitration panel. Parties may sign a binding agreement to go to a *beit din* even before controversy arises, or else they may both decide to go to a *beit din* to resolve a specific existing dispute.[6] This places *beit din* arbitration firmly outside of the realm of mandatory arbitration, since in almost all cases people who have agreed to go *beit din* did so of their own accord, either because they want to be judged based on Jewish law or because they find it more convenient than the court system (there have been some notable examples of non-Jews going to a *beit din* specifically because of its expedience and affordability![7]). Even if one of the parties dislike the *beit din* ruling, it is still voluntary arbitration because they agreed to come to *beit din* of their own volition, not because they would otherwise be denied a product or service.[8] Therefore, any limit on forced arbitration need not affect the *beit din*

system, neither in its operation nor in the enforceability of its rulings by the secular courts.

What appears from analysis of the issue is that arbitration has its positives and its negatives. While forced arbitration often seems to disfavor the consumer, it is explicitly protected by federal law and decades of legal precedent in Supreme Court rulings. There is the possibility of developing workarounds that effectively prevent forced arbitration, such as *Chavarria v. Ralphs*. Such a situation would require uniform passage and interpretation of unconscionability laws in every state, something already impossible, as several cases have been ruled in the opposite direction of *Chavarria v. Ralphs,* asserting that state laws limiting arbitration are precluded by the FAA.[9] Even assuming that somehow widespread mandatory arbitration could be made a relic of the past, it isn't so clear that we have much better systems for individuals to claim small sums of money. Small claims court is one option, but it deals exclusively with money and can't require the losing side to change its practices. Class action lawsuits are only viable in certain circumstances, and they highly favor the lawyer in charge of the case over the consumer; besides, the courts have traditionally preserved the right to class action bans in contracts, apparently excluding them from unconscionability laws.

Ultimately, the best solution for fair conflict resolution is to find a way to discourage *mandatory* arbitration while preserving arbitration as a realistic option but making it easier and cheaper for all parties. With the right improvements, arbitration may actually turn into the most convenient and fair solution for consumers as well as companies. Some arbitration associations have fee waivers for people living significantly below the poverty line; while that's not enough to ensure that arbitration is viable for everybody, it's a good start. Many have pointed out that if arbitration were to be made fair and convenient enough there would be no need for forced arbitration, as everyone would want to go to arbitration voluntarily.[10] Additionally, arbitration companies setting up a form of appeals or case review parallel to civil courts would reassure people that they have where to turn if they feel wronged without losing faith in the arbitration system.

The most important thing consumers can do is be aware of their rights and what they agree to. Some companies include in their terms of service a way to opt out of the arbitration clause, but knowing that takes a careful read of the contract. A law in congress requiring arbitration agreements to be conspicuously noted, clearly explained and given a separate page (unlike certain arbitration clauses in credit card agreements, which are simply a few extra words at the end of a long document in small print[11]) would go a very long way to helping consumers know their rights and what they're getting into. Neither companies nor individuals need fear improvements in the broader American legal system, for the shared vision of better justice can be appreciated by all.

END NOTES

1 "Net Neutrality: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO)" YouTube video, 13:17, posted by "LastWeekTonight," June 1, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpbOEoRrHyU.

2 Jean R. Sternlight, "Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?," *Stanford Law Review* 57, no. 5 (2005): 1634.

3 Ibid., 1649.

4 Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Robert Gebeloff, "Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice," *New York Times,* October 31, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html.

5 Sternlight, "Creeping Mandatory Arbitration," 1650.

6 Ginine Fried, "The Collision of Church and State: A Primer to Beth Din Arbitrarion [sic] and the New York Secular Courts," *Fordham Urban Law Journal* 31, no. 2 (2003): 642.

7 Ibid., 640.

8 Michael A. Helfand, "Arbitration's Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration Paradigm," *The Yale Law Journal* 124, no. 8 (2015): 3043.

9 Sternlight, "Creeping Mandatory Arbitration," 1646.

10 Ibid., 1657.

11 Greenberg and Gebeloff, "Arbitration Everywhere".

Can We Recreate the Human Brain?

Moshe Inger ('20)

The human brain is the most complex organ in the human body, and therefore the most complex organ in existence, and yet, people want to recreate it in a computer. This is a process that's been speculated about for quite some time, but only really attempted recently. There are many different things to take into account when determining if doing an amazing feat like this is actually possible, such as everything going on inside the brain, the power of the computer, the amount of electricity required, and even if the process of the human brain is an *entirely physical process*. For the last point, we're going to need to assume that it is, because unless we actually create an Artificial Intelligence, i.e., a human brain inside of a computer, we'll have no way of proving it either way. But for all the other things that need to be taken into account, we're going to need to go into a lot of detail about every single one.

First, we have to define artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence is "the theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages."[1] Modern-day technology has voice recognition, visual perception, and translation of languages (sometimes even better than humans), but they lack that decision making capability which ultimately separates humans from machines.

The tasks carried out by AI are similarly carried out in a brain. The human

brain has two major parts, the cerebrum and the cerebellum. The cerebellum is really just the tip of the bottom of the brain and the brain stem, but the cerebrum is a lot to talk about. The cerebrum is divided into four parts: the frontal lobes, which deal with thinking, planning, organizing, problem solving, short-term memory and movement; the parietal lobes, which deal with sensory information, such as temperature and touch; the occipital lobes, which, like the name would suggest, takes information from the eyes and links it with memories; and the temporal lobes, which deal with the senses of taste, smell, and sound, and are involved with memory storage.[2]

So to a certain extent the brain functions with neurons firing messages at each other. Neurons are essentially nerve cells special to the brain which send neurotransmitters, i.e. chemical signals, to each other as messages, closely resembling electric signals you might find in a machine. Neurons are all connected by dendrites, which receive incoming messages, and axons, which send outgoing messages, in varying amounts depending on the type of neuron. There are three main types of neurons: motor neurons, sensory neurons, and interneurons. Motor neurons have an axon on one end, a dendrite on the other, and are involved with things like movement and thinking. Sensory neurons have two dendrites on both ends, a short axon in the middle, and deal with your senses: touch, smell, taste, etc., and memories. Interneurons are just there to connect the other two types of neurons together.

It should be noted, however, that unlike AI, a brain does not rely entirely on neuronic connections. Whereas AI systems are totally built upon binary processing, in a brain there is much we still have to learn about and there are other aspects to a brain that are either not based on a system of binary processing and are much less tangible or that we simply haven't entirely understood. Binary processing is a system wherein a decision must be made and one of two responses (for example, yes or no) can be selected. This structure, on a much vaster scale, is essentially how computers and TVs make images appear on our screen or simulate chess games. The brain, on the other hand, has the power of imagination and a much more creative edge to it. This aspect of the brain is not necessarily structured upon binary processing and most likely cannot be put into a computer. Interestingly, since AI has a greater capacity for binary

processing, it will be able to calculate far more than a human—this is why twenty years ago the computer Deep Blue beat the reigning world chess champion at his own game.

Proponents of AI therefore have two approaches on how to reconstruct the neuronic aspects of human brains. Some suggest that wires in a computer are the same things as neurons. As mentioned earlier, the chemical signals do act a lot like wires. Neurons fire at an average rate of about 200 times per second, and there are about 100 billion of them in the human brain.[3] There is a potential for up to 2,000,000,000,000, that's 2 trillion, neurons to be firing at once. Translating this to physical wire, during the action potential of a neuron, part of the process of it firing, it fires at about 40 millivolts, 40/1,000 of a volt. That's about 80,000,000,000, eighty billion, volts of electricity *each second*. Putting that into perspective, the average power plant only produces about 25,000 volts per day. This is where problems arise. Another problem is that each neuron is connected to about 1,000 other neurons, and all of those are connected to about 1,000 other neurons, etc.[4] It's hardly physically possible to make all the necessary connections with physical wires in a grid that the brain makes between neurons.

The second approach to reconstructing a human brain in a computer is making a piece of computer software which could emulate all the actions of the human brain. That would definitely remove the problem of physically connecting all the wiring together, and the problem of the amount of power being used, but that brings up a new problem: how much processing power would a computer need to emulate billions and billions of neurons firing at once?

Fortunately, this has been attempted before. Henry Markram, a South African scientist, spent 15 years trying to remap a rat's brain as part of something called the Blue Brain Project, where a group of neuroscientists wanted to remap the human brain in a computer program and succeeded. They did this via a process called reverse-engineering, in which they looked at a how a rat's brain worked and remapped it into a computer, which took them about 10 years to complete. They did successfully recreate a brain, but there are two problems with this: firstly, a rat's brain has 10,000 neurons, which is nothing compared

to a human's 100 billion, and second, they weren't trying to recreate a *sentient* brain; they were just remapping the brain for the sake of diseases and health, not for the purposes of AI.

Nonetheless, this proves that neurons are recreatable, at least on a smaller scale. Markus Diesmann, a German neuroscientist, was able to recreate all 100 billion neurons in the human brain for a whole second, using 82,944 computer processors. That means that one computer processor can process about 120,563,272 nerve cells, for a second. Not too efficient, but unfortunately, that's everything modern technology can do for the time being.

Is it possible to recreate a human brain in a computer? It seems to be possible to recreate at least parts of the human brain, but not with the current levels of technology. The human race is constantly making scientific progression, so it should only be a matter of decades before there is a computer running all 100 billion neurons in the human brain. But if this is so, we're presented with one last problem: Is this moral? How ethical is it to create robots that have all the capabilities, if not more, than humans, their creators?

Isaac Asimov, a famous science-fiction writer and scientist, wrote the "laws of roboethics," the closest thing to a set of laws regarding the progression of robotics. They state that 1. A robot mustn't harm its master or another human 2. A robot must obey its master and all his commands, as long as this doesn't interfere with the First Law 3. A robot must protect itself and its existence as long as this doesn't interfere with the First and Second Laws. There is nothing official about these laws, yet they are the first step towards a fuller code of law for robots. The problem is, if you recreate the human brain as a sentient computer, it would be difficult to implement these laws, because the robot would be able to make its own decisions and decide it's not going to follow the first law, or the first two laws.

Even though we have a concept of "roboethics," which concerns ethical problems that occur with robots, such as if robots pose a threat to humans, whether some uses of robots are problematic, and how robots should be designed to act ethically, we never really enforce them. There's a strip of land about 2.5 miles

long between North and South Korea which is a complete war zone, known as the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Thousands of soldiers are on both sides patrolling it very strictly, and were one to step foot into that zone, they'd be filled with thousands of pieces of lead, instantly, without any human decision being made. South Korea has deployed a machine gun turret on the border of South Korea and the DMZ, which can lock onto a human target in the dead of night, and fill it with bullets. Basically, it's a robot that can kill a human, without needing the input of a human.

Granted, this isn't a human, but it's an autonomous robot, meaning it can make the decision to kill a man without needing the input of a man. It pushes some ethical boundaries, and it's things like this that need to make us question if we want to recreate a human brain in a computer.

So, in conclusion, it's not possible to make a physical grid of wires, but it is possible to create a computer program which recreates and emulates the 100 billion neurons in the human brain, though we may not want to do that. There are certain ethical boundaries that need to be considered and certain ideas that need to be thought into more deeply before we can decide if we, the human race, are ready to create artificial intelligence, robots which "are able to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, and decision-making."

END NOTES

1   www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095426960.

2   http://www.mayoclinic.org/brain/sls-20077047?s=3.

3   thephenomenalexperience.com/content/how-fast-is-your-brain.

4   Ibid.

Debates in the Jewish World in the Post-Sabbatean Period

Raziel Siegman ('17)

Following the brief success of Sabbetai Zevi in the 1660s, there was a period of turmoil and confusion in Jewish society. The Jewish leaders had to recuperate from the tragedy of Sabbetai Zevi and move on to a new, hopefully positive era, not dwelling on the unfortunate events of the past, while ensuring that every spark of the Sabbatean fire had been properly extinguished. However, in the 1750s, when heightened tension still remained from the Sabbatean movement, combined with the rise of Jacob Frank as a post genitor of Sabbetai Zevi—one of the largest rifts in Jewish history, between Rabbi Jonathan Eybeschutz and Rabbi Jacob Emden—resulted in a wide variety of reactions by Rabbinic figures. We have many of the writings of two such figures, who in many ways represent opposite poles in the schools of Jewish thought regarding Sabbateanism, Rabbi Yechezkel Landau and Rabbi Pinhas Katzenellenbogen.

According to Moaz Kahana, a professor of Jewish History at Tel Aviv University, in his book *The Allure of Forbidden Knowledge: The Temptation of Sabbatean Literature for Mainstream Rabbis in the Frankist Movement, 1756–1761,* R. Landau believed that the Sabbatean problem needed to be solved with harsh and extensive parameters. Landau, who was at the forefront of the fiery clash between R. Jacob Emden and R. Jonathan Eybeschutz, did not view Eybeschutz as a Sabbatean, but at the same time had harsh views towards potential Sabbateans in general. Landau believed that all Sabbatean writings should be burned, and their holders excommunicated. Then, in an effort to

create an even stronger fence against Sabbateanism, Landau declared that even the Zohar and Kabbalistic literature should be banned. Although he agreed that Kabbalah is *not* necessarily Sabbatean, Jewish society needed to be careful of the threat of Sabbateans interspersed in their communities who might misinterpret eschatological and similarly mystical texts.

R. Pinhas Katzenellenbogen, in contrast with R. Landau, was very open to many of the varieties of works that Landau was trying to ban. Throughout his life, Katzenellenbogen had been exposed to Kabbalah. In 1758, he writes in *Yesh Manhilim,* a notebook of events from Katzenellenbogen's life, about his fondness towards his childhood experiences with Rabbi Abraham Rovigo, a Kabbalist expert. Not only does Katzenellenbogen write about how he cherished these moments, but this was published at the time of heightened tensions during the Frankist rebellion, yet Katzenellenbogen had no issue publishing these encounters. Additionally, Katzenellenbogen read ideas from Nathan of Gaza, who was the false prophet who claimed that Sabbetai Zevi was the messiah. Katzenellenbogen believed that one cannot be blamed for believing that Sabbetai Zevi was the messiah in the 1660s, and one's Torah is still valid even if he was falsely convinced of this.

Kahana comes to the conclusion that there were two overarching approaches one could take regarding the infestation of Sabbateanism in Jewish culture. As demonstrated by Landau, one could decide that Sabbateanism was so dangerous that every trace of it had to be completely eliminated. Others, such as Katzenellenbogen, could not come to terms with removing all of Kabbalah—a heavily embraced topic at the time—from Judaism, and did not mind learning these ideas, even if they were written by Sabbateans. One of the driving forces between this harsh divide was how enticing Sabbatean and Kabbalistic ideas were, especially to rabbinic figures. This caused some to take more extreme measures to eliminate it, while it caused others to keep learning it.

There are many documents we have from these figures that shed much light on the debate. One is a letter by Landau to several Jewish communities in 1752, in which he denounces specific Sabbatean works, and calls for the excommunication of those who are found containing them. In his magnum opus, the

Nodeh Beyehudah, Landau interrupts one of his typical Halachic responses to discuss the issue of relics of Sabbateanism. In this statement, Landau does not only take issue with Sabbatean works, but condemns all Kabbalah and Zohar, as those who learn these topics "[cause] the Torah to be forgotten in Israel." Moaz Kahana identifies February 1756 as the time that this statement was written by Landau, explaining the seeming discrepancy between Landau's viewpoints. Just a few months prior, in December of 1755, Frank had crossed into Poland and supported Sabbateans, causing riots and arrests in the streets. These actions, still rising in severity at the time Landau published this statement in the *Nodeh Beyehudah,* caused a sense of urgency prompting Landau to take a harsher stance than he had taken a few years prior in 1752.

Although Katzenellenbogen was generally supportive of controversial Kabbalistic texts, there are various nuances in his writings. For example, in November 1758, Katzenellenbogen wrote a note in his *Shulchan Aruch of the Ari,* which also contained a multi-page section written by Nathan of Gaza. In this note, Katzenellenbogen denounces Nathan of Gaza as falsely prophesying regarding Sabbetai Zevi, and rejects any claims that he himself is a Sabbatean. The initial commotion brought by Jacob Frank (a Polish-Jewish leader who claimed to be a reincarnation of Sabbetai Zevi) in the end of 1755 did not rouse Katzenellenbogen, but the events in the years that followed encouraged him to finally make a statement clarifying his Sabbatean intentions. In 1757, the Sabbateans of Kaminiec-Podolsk had triumphed in a public debate overseen by the priests, followed by the burning of the Talmud. Then, in 1758, Frank had been granted protection in Poland by Augustus III. Kahana argues that this series of events finally convinced Katzenellenbogen that the Sabbatean threat was strong and widespread enough that it was necessary for him to completely dispel any rumors that he may be a Sabbatean.

Throughout Kahana's discussion of Katzenellenbogen, he places a heavy emphasis on a line that Katzenbogen paraphrased from the Talmud[1] of "learning Torah even from Aher."[2] This refers to a series of stories where Rabbi Meir, a great Torah scholar, learned from the heretic Aher. However, as eloquent as this line may seem, there is a significant distinction between Katzenellenbogen's learning from those who believed in Sabbetai Zevi, and R. Meir, who

learned from Aher the heretic. In R. Meir's encounters with Aher, R. Meir is not approaching him for advice or sacred thoughts. In most of the examples, Aher approaches R. Meir and asks him a question, after which a short discussion ensues between the two. There is also a story where Aher is pursued by R. Meir in an effort to keep him from traveling, and thus violating the Sabbath.

When the Talmud says that R. Meir learned Torah from Aher, it is not referring to an ideal situation. R. Meir found it worthwhile to contact Aher, in an effort to bring him closer to the Jewish life that he had strayed from. However, it is inconceivable that R. Meir eagerly approached Aher to learn Torah from him. Contrastingly, when Katzenellenbogen learned Torah from Sabbateans, it was certainly not with the intention that it was a necessary evil in order to rid the Sabbateans of their flawed theologies. On the contrary, he did so with the mindset that their works should ideally be learned from, as long as one is careful not to be enticed by their Sabbatean beliefs.

Whereas Rabbi Landau saw the Sabbatean period as an unfortunate blip in Jewish history with no inherent value to the ideals it flourished on, Rabbi Katzenellenbogen could not help but be touched by the mysticism that Sabbetai Zvi preached. R. Landau took a hard stand against the issue, not allowing any Kabbalah to be learned. On the other extreme was R. Katzenellenbogen, who not only studied Kabbalah, but even learned ideas from those who believed in Sabbateanism. Through all the upheaval around him, Katzenellenbogen was able to stay true to his beliefs and not over-concern himself with those vilifying all remote ties to Sabbateanism.

END NOTES

1   Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Hagigah, 15b.

2   The Jewish Quarterly Review, Vol. 102, No. 4 (Fall 2012) 607.

Eurasianism and the Traditional School

Rabbi Mayer Schiller

Introduction

It is most difficult to enter worlds radically different from our own. This is true both culturally as well as theoretically. For those raised and trained in the popular or academic aftermath of the French Revolution and living in North America, western or central Europe (hereafter, the Atlantic Community), there is a linear view of history which has become almost universally accepted. Alternatively known as the Whig or progressive understanding of human affairs, it sees localized national or civilizational birth and death as irrelevant to history. What is of real consequence is the forever forward progress of mankind, at times hindered or temporarily halted by malevolent forces of reaction, but, ultimately, fated to triumph. Perhaps, we might more accurately posit that the *'Revolution'* is never ending. Each triumph of "progress" and "reform" is followed by yet another demand to be met. The "sexual revolution" forever demands the legitimization of newer forms of what was once seen as decadence. What emerges is a constant vision, just beyond the horizon, awaiting another reform, the failure to adapt to being seen as evil and retrogressive. Described sometimes as the Left, this ideology really appears in many forms ranging from 1789 France to the UK government under Tony Blair. The latter sought, paradoxically, to preach egalitarian dogmas while supporting the world of global finance, and paying lip service to "pluralism" while leading a foreign policy which seeks to impose its values upon all mankind. Supposedly

opposed by an "ideology" labeled neo-conservatism, we find, upon a minimum of investigation, that it is, essentially, the same as its stated rivals.

This worldview has been opposed since the French Revolution (or, as Catholics of the pre-Vatican II era might assert, pre-Reformation)[1] by an assortment of Counter Revolutionary philosophies, described alternatively as the Right[2] or, as they have come to be known in America, paleo-conservative. The thinkers of this school do not perceive the post-Revolutionary world as superior to that which came before, rather, as generally inferior, with the possible exception of certain industrial or medical advances. For them human life is not linear. There are eternal verities that govern all men, either Revelatory (metaphysical) or deeply rooted in the human condition.

The Counter Revolution no longer has a voice in the contemporary Atlantic Community.[3] It is criminalized or, at least, ostracized by the totalist hegemony which dictates all political discourse today. Some might argue that the fusionism of Burkean, constitutionalist and/or Catholic, Anglo–Catholic thought, which once formed the 1950s *National Review/Modern Age* opposition philosophy on these shores offered a real philosophical alternative to the hegemony.[4] Be that argument as it may, this stance has also long been relegated to the sidelines by the virulent control of the two "neos," which has consigned the surviving remnant of anti-New Deal and anti-imperialist right wingers to the status of silenced and demonized.[5]

Our goal in what follows is to explore two schools of thought, both of which reject the Whig catechism of 'endless-progress.' These two worldviews cannot be located within the tiny and heavily walled-in framework of political thought in the Atlantic Community. Although each has a fairly long pedigree, they have recently received potent injections of creative thinking. As the post-World War II power sources weaken before our eyes, with the quarter of a century old, passing of Communism and the increasing divide, in the former non-Communist lands, between the "elites" of wealth and "wisdom" and their increasingly alienated masses,[6] it is of importance to cast a glance at some alternative understandings.

In order to do so the reader will have to abandon preconceived notions, particularly the lumping of political/religious positions into simplified bundles. He must have the willingness to proceed with a heart and mind both open and creative. Otherwise, what follows may titillate but prove of little value. *Caveat emptor.*

Eurasianism

Any discussion of Eurasianist philosophy must first issue two clarifications. 1) The movement has two stages in its development. The first is located largely in the Russian emigre community which settled throughout Europe in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution (1917) and the subsequent five year Civil War between Red and White armies (1917–1923). This was a group which had to reinvent itself, torn from its homeland, with most of its pre-existing social/cultural and religious institutions destroyed.[7] The second phase occurred in Russia itself since the fall of Communism and the proliferation of philosophies which emerged to fill the void. This form of Eurasianism had to answer two basic question: What is Russia? Where Russia should be heading?[8]

2) Further, the Eurasianists of the present have a similar worldview to what is known variously as the French or European New Right (henceforth ENR), a movement which lies far beyond American political categorization. We will have to explain the basics of their worldview as well, in order to understand its relationship with the second phase of Eurasianism. There is a unique relationship between many Eurasianist ideas and the Traditionalist School of Thought (also known as Perennialism or perennial philosophy, which we will discuss later). This is particularly due to the former being based in Eastern Orthodox faith.

What, then, was Phase One Eurasianism? Who were the Eurasianists? These questions may be first answered by listing some of its founding thinkers. Prince Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy (1890–1938) was a Russian aristocrat and, later, a career linguist. Fleeing Russia in 1920, he began his teaching anew at the University of Vienna. He was profoundly anti-Nazi and wrote many

articles in this vein. Just a few weeks before the Anschluss and after several attacks by Nazi gangs, he died at age 48 of a heart attack.[9] Trubetskoy famously wrote, "Everything that now appears is from the element of the past, because *ex nihilo nihil fit*. The prolific development of culture demands that the inventory of values be kept in the memory of tradition and passed to future generations through symbolic *mimesis*." By seeing a people's identity in a past to be cherished, Trubetskoy creatively added the element of being both anti-chauvinist (which he defined as the "belief in the superiority of some cultures over others") and anti-cosmopolitan (seen as "the belief that all mankind must have a single culture" to be "overseen by supra-ethnographic elites.") He was also a fervent opponent of the colonization of Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America and the attempted European dominations of Asia. In a fascinating aspect of this thinking, Trubetskoy saw evolution as linked to European chauvinism.[10] He believed that whatever might be the reality of species' evolution, this theory, when applied to politics, will often yield the belief that Atlantic Community models are inherently superior to the political models of the more organically (as opposed to ideologically) rooted forms of Third World peoples.

Also of that early circle we find Gorgii Florovski, an Orthodox theologian who would, after fleeing Communist Russia, arrive in first Paris and then New York where he taught and published on matters of religion. A profound opponent of mixing Scholastic and Protestant dogmas with that of the Eastern Church, he is emblematic of Eurasianism's devotion to Russian sacred beliefs.[11] He did, however, contribute much to the study of psychology, specifically the structuralist theory, which posits that human behavior cannot be grasped without first understanding the structural similarities between groups and individuals, regardless of outer differences.

Let us rapidly mention two other figures, each of whom may be seen as representing other facts of Eurasianism. Erzhen Khara-Davan was a non-Russian, of Kalmyk descent (whose ancestors came from China to Russia centuries earlier.) He wrote extensively on Genghis Khan and the Mongol invasions, the relevance of which we will soon turn to. A practicing Buddhist and Eurasianist, he was an intriguing figure. He tried to amalgamate aspects of Asia and

Russia in a mutually enriching spiritual existence.[12]

Finally, there is the fascinating figure of Yakov Bromberg. As his name indicates, Bromberg was Jewish and remained, although not Orthodox, devout in his own idiosyncratic way. He was loyal throughout his life to Mother Russia. Forced post-1917 to live in exile in New York, he wrote extensively of the spiritual threat which America and Americanism posed to religion worldwide.[13]

Let us now summarize some of the core beliefs of early Eurasianism. The first is, generally speaking, devotion to some form of traditional Russian Orthodoxy. However, in keeping with the view that Russia's soul is primarily in harmony with Asia and the Middle East, we find, from the beginning, welcoming of Jews, Buddhists and Muslims. This belief is solidified by a novel reading of the Mongol invasions of Europe. Despite Genghis Khan being a Tengrist, his rule and that of later Mongol rulers was remarkably tolerant to all faiths.[14] This is seen by Eurasian historians as indicative of the broad acceptance of religious forms which united the east and Russia. This is very relevant to Eurasianism and the Traditionalist School, as we will soon see.

Another important aspect of early and contemporary Eurasianism is its anti-Western, and more emphatically rather anti-American, empathies. The Atlantic Community is viewed as superficial, materialist and imperialist.[15] Following this note, many Eurasianists had mixed feelings on communal economics. They despised Communism's coercive atheism but were not similarly so opposed to its economic communalism. This become more relevant in the 1990s with the advent of philosophies such as National Bolshevism[16] and in figures such as Vladimir Putin, whose eventual rejection of his early Communist beliefs was rooted in a personal religious experience, not an acceptance of Western style, secularist global capitalism. For the Eurasianist, Western Europe, the Atlantic Community or Euro-centrism are all terms for a place and mindset of conformity, which rejects the basic building blocks of individuals and cultures, such as language, memory, geography, myth, religion and the like. Trubetskoy, alternatively, described Eurasia as an "ethnological and cultural unity." As opposed to the Atlantic Community, with its desire of hegemonic power over all peoples, the Eurasianist allows and desires that all peoples

should preserve their identities and communal meanings. It is this sense of anti-imperialism, of viewing America and Western Europe as consistently imperialist, whether in the Crusades, the 19th century dash to conquer Africa, the Middle East and Asia in order to missionize and economically exploit them, or the 21st century endless wars in Islamic lands (often with the declared intention of "converting" them to 21st century versions of "Americanism"), which has led Eurasianism to alliances with Third World liberation movements and the stauncher elements of the European left. The political view is a reflection of what is often described in their writings as a "multiverse" in opposition to the "universe" of the West's Christianity, as well as its current monolithic secular "democracy," democratic, Eurasianists would maintain, only insofar as elections produce candidates desired by Washington.

Think in this context of either Salvador Allende (1908–1973), a Chilean Marxist elected in 1970 and ousted in a 1973 by an American-backed coup, or the Algerian FLN, which garnered at least triple the vote of its opponents in the 2012 legislative polls, only to be refused recognition by America. Or, going further back, does anyone question today who would have won the free elections, guaranteed at Geneva in 1954, for the entirety of Vietnam? Free elections, which, in the Eurasian and general leftist view, were effectively postponed by America, until South Vietnamese support for Ho Chi Minh created the NLF (Viet Cong). In fact, while not digressing too far, strong cases have been made that the ideologically enigmatic Nguyen Tho (NLF leader) and even Ho Chi Minh himself (originally) saw themselves as populist idealists with little interest in "International Communism" but simply in localized socialism. Nonetheless, this vast popular movement was fought against for over a quarter century by France and, later, America. The advocates of the multiverse see themselves as being for "peoples" and against globalist hegemony.

European New Right[17]

Let us recall, now, that the early leaders of ENR saw themselves as charting a new course after the abandonment of French Algeria in 1962. (Some thinkers of the movement point to the 70% of Algerians who voted for independence as

a turning point leading them away from their former pro-colonial beliefs.)[18] And, they add, it was the student protests which shut down French campuses and many industries in May 1969 which signaled to them that something was deeply amiss in the soul of their own society.[19]

The two leading early philosophers of ENR were Alain de Benoist (1946–) and Guillaume Faye (1949–). In the close to forty years of this orientation's existence it has spawned "think tanks" and publications across Europe. Drawing on everything from sociobiology to paganism, from deep seated love of their own to a forceful respect of Islamic immigrants' self-identity, they have baffled mainstream European political thinkers by being neither racist nor cosmopolitan. Faye and Benoist have parted company over the question of Islamic immigration. Faye sees it as a mortal threat while Benoist sees it as a threat only so long as French natives live out of synch with their own culture.[20]

Sophia Perennis or Traditional School[21]

We turn now to a theological school (mentioned earlier) which supplies much of the conceptual roots for recent manifestations of Eurasianism and some segments of the European New Right. Essentially, the ENR and Eurasianists reject the monotheistic universalism of some forms of Christianity, which they view as inherently triumphalist and/or exclusionist. In order to "make room for peoples," they utilize either a Heideggerian sense of humanity's inability to escape their self and circumstances, flavored with a postmodernist rejection of classical and Enlightenment ideologies of rationally discoverable and universal truths. Alternatively, they have recourse to the Traditionalist School.

There are those who would classify Traditionalism (Sophia Perennis) as traceable to Platonism, especially its view of eternal forms, which serve as metaphysical bedrock for all religions. Agostino Steuco (1497–1548) expressed this viewpoint when he wrote, "All things have one principle, of which there have always been one and the same knowledge among all peoples." This belief in the ultimate religion or Divinity behind all faiths finds articulation in as varied sources as Emersonian Transcendentalism and Madame Blavatsky's

(1831–1891) Theosophy.[22] Schools of Hindu Universalism[23] as well as differing forms of esoterism may also be said to be reflecting a lineage of this strain in *Sophia Perennis*. This, in turn, yielded much of the spiritual underpinnings of the New Left. We recall in this context the once iconic work *Where the Wasteland Ends* by Theodore Roszak (1933–2011), an advocate of the many causes associated with the then-trendy notion of "the greening of America," who was inspired by many forms of spiritual service ranging from the Native American ceremonies to Buddhist rites.[24] With everyone from the Rolling Stones to the Beach Boys[25] then heading to their own Asian guru, it was a time of syncretism, whose blending of assorted spiritual paths may be seen as a form of Universalist Traditionalism.

In his fundamental work on the subject, *The Perennial Philosophy,* Aldous Huxley (1894–1963) writes,

> ... the metaphysics that recognizes a Divine Reality substantial to the world of things and lives and minds; the psychology that finds in the soul something similar to or even identical to, Divine Reality; the ethic that places man's final end in the knowledge of the immanent and transcendent Ground of all being; the thing is immemorial and universal. Rudiments of the perennial philosophy may be found among the traditional lore of primitive peoples in every region of the world, and in its fully developed forms it has its place in every one of the higher regions.[26]

Although this school of Traditionalist thought is worth reflecting upon, and much of its political incarnations—localist, small, anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist and intensely spiritual—finds echoes in Eurasianism (and in much of Third World liberation nationalisms), it is not to be confused with contemporary Eurasianism's approach to ultimate matters.

One of the leading thinkers of contemporary Eurasianism is Alexander Dugin. This prolific author and thinker is a pious Orthodox Christian seeing Eurasia as a bulwark against the Atlantic Communities imperialist secularism. Dugin's major work on this matter, *Eurasian Mision* (2014), explores the link between religion and politics. Dugin, like many of the traditionalist school, has a vision

not of syncretism but of particularistic traditions all drawing from and revealing the Ultimate—this belief lies at the heart of the traditionalist doctrine.

In the words of a major twentieth thinker of this orientation, Frithjof Schuon (1907–1998),

> ... total truth is inscribed in an eternal script in the very substance of our spirit, what the different Revelations do is 'crystallize' and 'actualize,' in differing degrees, according to the case, a nucleus of certitudes which not only abide forever in the divine Omniscience, but also sleeps by refraction in the 'naturally spiritual' kernel of the individual, as well as in each ethnic or historical collectivist ...

In other words, what Schuon and his teacher, the French philosopher Rene Guenon (1886–1951), taught, was that all orthodoxies are, at root, apprehending the same truth(s), although each has a different revelatory source and achieves salvation via diverse ritualistic practices. This allows mankind to accept the Other as normative. However, most Traditionalists urge that we must follow the initiatory means of each faith community exactly as they have been passed down.

This leads to a rejection of all mono-vocal dogmas, be they of crusading secularism/liberalism or of a presentation of monotheism which strips other faiths of their legitimacy. To Guenon, universalist secularisms are simply alternative human religions created to offer shallow imitations of the authentic faith communities. As Dugin writes, "All of them (Communism, Fascism and Liberalism) are of racist character; the biological racism of the Nazis, Marx's class racism in his ideas concerning predestined universal progress and evolution, and the civilizational, cultural and colonialist racism of liberalism."[27] Communism and contemporary hegemonic leftism are excellent examples of this. Each offers dogmas ("sciences") where, for example, in the case of the former, dialectical materialism is a global summons to "dictatorship of the proletariat" and, finally, yielding eternal bliss with the fading of government in the classless "utopia" of the future. It is not only this strange dogma which mirrors Christianity but think similarly of all the American crusades to "end all wars,"

to "make the world safe for democracy," to liberate Iraq today and the Philippines yesterday, strip them of their religion and culture and bring them the "blessings" of "Americanism".

Against this, the likes of Guenon and leading Traditionalists Titus Burckhardt (1908–1984), Huston Smith (1919–2016), and Hossein Nasser (1933–) sought and seek to rediscover ancient orthodoxies in their own identities, and translate them into a language authentic yet reverent for our times. Fittingly, a visit to any New Age bookstore will yield the above writer's works alongside those of the trendiest New Age thinkers.

Political Ramifications

Traditionalists and Eurasianists view the contemporary Atlantic Community's embrace of mind-controlled campuses, government-enforced worldviews and the coerced dogmas of trendy leftism as a light-minded and passing fad, the death throes of a shattered and shrinking civilization. They believe that the increasingly financially precarious globalism of the international economy is deeply resented by most of mankind. It will be defeated, they posit, from within, by immigrant populations loyal to their gods and their identities, and by the growing forces of Eurasia and their natural allies of Africa, Latin America and aboriginal Pacific Islanders from without.

They offer an affirmation of the human spirit in its deepest religious, albeit diverse, identities. It is worth thinking of the likes of a Ralph Nader or Noam Chomsky and how many of their foreign and domestic policy decisions are similar to those of the ENR and Eurasianism. To the likes of a Guenon, de Benoist or the Russian Dugin there are two drives in the world: one is monolithic, hegemonic and crusading, while the other is diverse, defending the small. In sum, it is quantity versus quality, colossus versus the human.

Abjuring the Counter Revolutionary

The Eurasianist and Traditionalist are not easy allies with old school Counter Revolutionary thought. Although the Counter Revolution had many forms, ranging from its original notion of simple restorationism and rejection of the Reformation and liberalism to the many authoritarian movements of the 1920s and '30s (some Catholic, some pagan, some materialist), they were all united in their devotion to a top down social structure and their looking to bring back an idealized pre-revolutionary era.

Contrarily, the Eurasian thinks that 1) the restorationist option has been thoroughly defeated and 2) its perspectives were far too limited. In addition, neither the Atlantic Community (and the European Union), now firmly wedded to political censorship, or the Catholic Church, whose Pope seems to despise all aspects of his own faith, are capable of establishing alternatives to the current power wielders.

This means that as the Atlantic Community withers, the Eurasianists will not find easy ground to agree with right wing parties in the west that loathe the social liberalization and geopolitical decline of their nations. As much as both the Eurasianists and paleo-conservatives of the west might demand for renewed national feeling, they will not necessarily recognize each other's call.

Whither Israel and Jewry?

If the collapse of secularist/capitalist Western hegemony is upon us—and this is certainly a possibility—how might this affect Israel, in particular, and Jewry in general? This is an intriguing question. It thrusts us into the realm of G-d's mysterious ways in history. Israel at present has cast its lot largely with the Atlantic Community, the only nations which offer it support and sympathy in its difficult path in the Middle East.

However, Prime Minister Netanyahu, since 2015, has had four personal meetings with Vladimir Putin and, according to *Middle East News,* over a dozen

lengthy phone conversations. Apparently, Israel sees no reason to alienate Russia, which no longer harbors the old Soviet animosity to the Jewish state. In addition, simple Israeli demographics yield that in the not too distant future the state will be majority Orthodox, albeit of many varieties. Will the Atlantic Community, with its visceral disdain for all who assert, say, traditional sexual norms, be capable of seeing this future state as a partner in its globalist mission? And, where does the Orthodox Jew living primarily in the Atlantic Community see his future in lands whose future seems to lie somewhere between ever more statistic anti-religiosity on the one hand and, ironically, on the other, the transformation of many of its neighborhoods into closed off Islamic religious zones (see Paris or Brussels). Is there a role here for a presentation of Jewish Orthodox norms in these increasingly hostile environments?

Thus far, many public manifestations of Orthodoxy have sought to silence our assertion of Torah norms in a society which demonizes much that we hold sacred. How will that play out? In sum, is the two and half century Jewish sympathy for Enlightenment politics still relevant in a post Whig world?

END NOTES

1 Perhaps the best presentation of Counter Revolutionary theory in English remains Thomas Molnar's *The Counter-Revolution* (Funk & Wagnalls: 1969).

2 Here, too, there is a classic work, Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana* (Martino: 2015). This is a re-issue of the 1953 first edition. The subtitle was later changed to *From Burke to Eliot*.

3 Molnar was an early analyst of North America and Western Europe as their own identity. See his *The Emerging Atlantic Culture* (Transaction: 1994). Of late it seems that Germany, at least its current government, must also be seen as subject to the Atlantic Community's policies.

4 For a thorough analysis of this fusionist-conservative movement, once professed by the young William F. Buckley, developed by Frank Meyer and today abandoned, see George Nash's monumental *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945* (Basic Books: 1976).

5   See *The Conservative Movement in America: Making Sense of the American Right* (Palgrave: Macmillan: 2007) by Paul Gottfried for an overview of the purge of the paleos from "respectable" circles.

6   The elites have become openly derisive of the masses who increasingly reject their wealthy elitism, calling them "deplorables" and "populists" most notably in the recent American election.

7   A good collection of essays on this early Eurasianism is *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism* (University of Pittsburgh: 2015).

8   A good introduction to contemporary Eurasianism is offered by one of its most prolific exponents, Alexander Dugin. See, in particular, his *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Contemporary Neo-Eurasianism* (Arktos: 2014).

9   For a superb overview of Trubetskoy's thought, see the chapter "N. S. Trubetskoy's Europe and Mankind and Eurasianist Antirevolutionism" by Sergey Glebov in *Between Europe and Asia* pp. 48–68.

10 Fortunately, Trubetskoy's basic works *Europe and Mankind* (1922) and *The Problem of Russian Self Cognition* (1928) do exist, unlike many Phase One Eurasianists, in English.

11 Florovskii's magnum opus, *The Way of Russian Orthodoxy,* is currently out of print.

12 Khara-Davan's work *Ghengis Kahn* was self-published in English in Belgrade: 1925.

13 For more on Bromberg see *Between Europe and Asia,* op. cit, page 3.

14 See Mark Bassin's "Narrating Kulikovo," pp. 165–193 in *Between Europe and Asia,* op. cit.

15 A quick overview of Eurasianism's view of America may be found in Dugin, *Eurasian Mission,* op. cit. pp. 112–121.

16 See Alexander Dugin, *Putin vs. Putin: Vladimir Putin Viewed from the Right* (Arktos: 2014) pp. 151–159.

17 The best overall work on the French, alternatively European, New Right in English is Michael O'Meara's *New Culture, New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe* (1st Books: 2004).

18 For the Algerian controversy as part of the ENR growth process see O'Meara, pp. 16–17.

19 On the effect of May 1968 on the birth pangs of the FNR, see O'Meara pp. 18–33.

20 For a recent statement of Benoist's views see "Alain de Benoist Answers Tamir Bar-On" in *Journal for the Study of Radicalism,* Vol. 8, No. 1, pp, 141–168.

21 A fine overview of the history and philosophies of this school, albeit from a staunchly negative viewpoint is *Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century* by Mark Sedgwick (Oxford: 2004). For a

similar study from an adherent, there is William W. Quinn, Jr.'s *The Only Tradition* (NYU: 1997).

22 See Sedgwick, op. cit. pp. 43-44, 47, 50 for Theosophic antecedents of Traditionalism.

23 See Sedgwick, pp. 22–24 *et alia*.

24 *Where the Wasteland Ends* (Doubleday: 1972) of the late Theodore Roszak remains a moving presentation of the New Left's spiritual side.

25 Mike Love of the Beach Boys devotes many pages (169–195) of his autobiography, *Good Vibrations: My Life As a Beach Boy,* to time spent with his gurus in India.

26 Huxley searched for legitimate forms of this philosophy for long and hard years. The quote is from *The Perennial Philosophy* (Harper: 1945).

27 *Eurasian Mission,* op. cit, 141.

Heinrich Mann's Ambiguous Repudiation of Nietzsche

Dr. Seth Taylor

In his 1910 essay entitled *Geist und Tat* (Spirit and Deed), the German writer Heinrich Mann challenged artists and intellectuals to join the fight for German democracy and give up the elitist individualism they inherited from the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. Mann's comments about Nietzsche in *Geist und Tat* have long been misunderstood by literary historians who have analyzed the relationship between Mann and Nietzsche in the shadow of traditional assumptions about Nietzsche's role as the philosopher of the German right.[1] At best, scholars have seen *Geist und Tat* as representative of Mann's complete break with Nietzsche. At worst, they have been unable to distinguish between Mann's development and their own assumptions that Nietzsche was the forerunner of German fascism. According to these assumptions, Nietzsche's critique of culture, his immoralism and his irrationalistic philosophy of life justified the aims of German militarism and played a pivotal role in those cultural developments in Germany which led to fascism.

These assumptions have been challenged by this author's own work, *Left-Wing Nietzscheans: The Politics of German Expressionism, 1910–1920,* which points to a left-wing Nietzschean tradition in Germany that climaxed during the First World War in the political and cultural movement known as German Expressionism.[2] For the Expressionists, Nietzsche's critique of culture, rather than being directed against the West as was that of the German right, was instead against German authoritarianism and militarism. Nietzsche's

immoralism likewise served as the substance for a rebellion by young people against a culture where moral virtue meant conformity to an authoritarian state. Even Nietzsche's irrationalism was not an invitation to imperialism, as Nietzsche's critics have suggested, but instead a remedy for a failed rational tradition which had lost its focus on ethical questions and had become a mere instrument in the advancement of science and the maintenance of the political status quo. For the historian of Germany, this means that Nietzsche's irrationalism, which has long been seen as a primary source of German militarism, was rather, for the prewar generation of young intellectuals, a weapon against it.

Just as historians have misunderstood Nietzsche's role in German history, so have literary historians misunderstood *Geist und Tat* as Heinrich Mann's complete repudiation of the philosophic inspiration of his youth. In reality, *Geist und Tat* repudiates only a part of Nietzsche's philosophy: his elite individualism. There is no repudiation of Nietzsche's irrationalism and no indication that Mann viewed Nietzsche as an exponent of militarism. His comments after 1910 are marked by their attempt to defend Nietzsche from his interpreters on the right. In fact, long after *Geist und Tat,* Mann's thinking remained highly indebted to Nietzsche's critique of culture and even his irrational philosophy of life. To demonstrate this, it is necessary to examine Mann's early preoccupation with Nietzsche and the way Mann came to turn away from him.

From his first successful novel, written in 1900 and called *Im Schlaraffenland* (In the Land of Cockaigne), Mann, like so many of his generation, was absorbed by a variety of complementary themes derived from Nietzsche, including the decadence of bourgeois society versus the artist's life of aesthetic individualism freed from conventional values, as well as the excessive rationalism of German culture versus the vital lives lived by some of the protagonists in Mann's early work. These themes were common to the writers of Mann's generation, and not merely because of the growing impact of Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche's critique of German culture was just the first perception of a cultural crisis that would be discerned by almost all young German intellectuals and artists around 1890, approximately the time Nietzsche's meteoric rise to nothing less than a cult figure began.[3]

That crisis had several causes, all rooted in Germany's dramatic economic transformation since unification in 1871. The bourgeoisie now furnished the industrial might of the new Reich, and yet they remained subservient to the political power and authoritarian values of a reactionary aristocracy. Moreover, bourgeois economic success was accompanied by the rise of a variety of scientistic doctrines which undermined traditional religious values and replaced them with a soulless materialism, making man a mere product of his environment and biological constitution. In reaction to this vulgar materialism, an entire generation of young intellectuals turned to Nietzsche's aesthetic philosophy of the great individual who creates himself. As Mann later recalled:

> In those days it (Nietzsche's work) seemed to justify us to ourselves...
> Joyfully we trusted the individualist who was...the opponent of the
> state...He placed the proud spirit at the head of the society he demand-
> ed—that was us, of course.[4]

Mann's early development was typical of artists of this generation. Born in 1871, Heinrich was raised with his younger brother, Thomas, in one of the more prominent middle class families of Lübeck. As grain importers, the Manns belonged to the declining pre-industrial *Bürgertum* (middle class), whose position was steadily being eroded and replaced by the new industrial bourgeoisie. Not only was an entire class being replaced, but even the traditional values to which this class adhered were also being undermined by the new ethics of industrial capitalism. The old German *Bürger* practiced loyalty to class; the new bourgeoisie coveted societal advancement through capital accumulation. Whereas the *Bürger* were civic-minded, abstemious and cultured, the bourgeoisie appeared to the former to be unethically competitive and greedy.

The decision to abandon their father's occupation and seek the artistic life was typical of young people from this class, the reservoir of the artistic renaissance which Germany began to experience at the end of the century. The gap between traditional *bürgerlich* values and the new competitiveness of industrial capitalism worked to invalidate the traditional values and rigid social norms of the former. Heinrich, like many of his generation, would seek refuge from a

collapsing value system in the aesthetic life, a life which rejected conventional moral values and posited personal creative expression as the highest goal.

Mann's aestheticism, however, had at first a distinctly conservative tendency, as revealed by his position from 1894 to 1896 as the editor of *Das Zwanzigste Jahrhundert,* a conservative, anti-Semitic, and anti-capitalistic journal. Here, Mann expressed himself against materialism, science, and the liberal bourgeoisie. These attitudes were common among intellectuals of the time and not necessarily indicative of a conservative position. Yet what distinguishes *Das Zwanzigste Jahrhundert* as a conservative journal is that the antidote to these cultural failings was found in nationalism and its corollary anti-Semitism, in a greater devotion to the German way.

Particularly interesting is Mann's article about Nietzsche, which appeared in the journal and sheds light on Mann's early understanding of that philosopher and Mann's subsequent political development. In "Zum Verständnisse Nietzsches," Mann observed that there were two contradicting sides to Nietzsche: an activist philosopher promoting the cultural rebirth of Germany through art, and an aesthetic individualist who was critical of Germany and interested only in self-cultivation. For Mann, the new German culture to which Nietzsche looked forward was one where the rational man listened to his intuitive side. It was in Nietzsche's disappointment that art had failed to bring a rebirth of German culture that Mann found the origins of Nietzsche's critical attitude toward Germany and his aesthetic individualism.

Mann's observation that, for Nietzsche, art had failed to precipitate a rebirth in Germany, heralded his own future turn to politics. Yet even more important is Mann's suspicion that Nietzsche's elitist individualism was simply the result of his failure as a cultural reformer. That suspicion reappeared in Mann's first major successful novel, *Die Göttinnen,* written in 1903, which contrasted the decadent morality of the bourgeois work with the nobler spirit of the Duchess of the imaginary kingdom of Assy, a remnant of a bygone aristocratic era. In his important article on Mann's early reception of Nietzsche, Roger Nicholls stressed the freedom from ressentiment as the key to the noble character of Mann's Duchess, as well as for Nietzsche.

The valuations of the bourgeois society with which the Duchess comes in contact are inextricably involved in a sense of reactive envy and revenge....Only she is able to make judgments freely, independently, disinterestedly.[5]

In contrast to the reactive person, the Duchess lives the life of aesthetic individualism, always acting in accordance with her natural self. Yet even in *Die Göttinnen* Mann questioned the feasibility of the aesthetic life. The Duchess experiences boredom and disappointment. She searches for convictions but falls only into goalless hedonism. "It is," concludes Nicholls, "the emptiness and longing for life that impels her, not fullness or excess."[6]

If Mann's disappointment with aestheticism was signaled in *Die Göttinnen,* his essay of 1905 entitled *Gustav Flaubert and George Sand* was a direct attempt to analyze his problems with this doctrine.[7] Indeed, the autobiographical nature of the essay was recognized even then by Mann's contemporaries, Gottfried Benn and Wilhelm Herzog.[8] Mann's representation of Flaubert was based on Nietzsche's own appraisal of that artist as a decadent, i.e., an artist who draws his own creativity from his contempt for life.[9] Criticism of society, for Flaubert, became a romantic flight from society. The cause of this decadence was that he perceived too much about society. As Nietzsche said about Hamlet that "knowledge kills action," so noted Mann about Flaubert: "For the truth about him is that he not only ceased to believe in adventurous action but in all action; his disappointments...made him flee the world."[10] Significantly, Mann used Nietzsche's critique of decadence to criticize Flaubert for the same elitist detachment from society that he found characteristic of Nietzsche in his early article about the philosopher.

The disappointment which made Flaubert a decadent was the failure of the Revolution of 1848, which, in Mann's description, seems quite similar to the failure of liberalism in Germany during Mann's lifetime. Indeed, his description of French society in the Second Empire recalls the critique of German society in Nietzsche's second untimely meditation, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life".

> They have become more narrowly specialized, held themselves always less accountable to humanity and always more accountable to concepts, to science, or business...[They] have become more historical and thereby less natural, for nature has only a present.[11]

The possibility of an escape from decadence is the theme of the confrontation in the second part of the essay between Flaubert and George Sand, who brings with her love and understanding as well as a faith in the ideals of 1789. He wrote of Sand:

> For her, the novel is not a flight from life. She sees no means for art in the historical, rather only in the human. She does not retreat into history; she makes a model out of the present. Again and again she hits upon the Revolution and is not deterred by 1793...But her true field is, however, 1789, that Arcadian festival of brotherhood.[12]

Mann had thus used Nietzsche's psychology of the artist to critique Flaubert, himself and Nietzsche. He adopted Sand's principle of love and faith in the ideals of 1789 and concluded in his essay that "art must serve life,"[13] a very Nietzschean resolution even if Mann no longer agreed that solitary self-cultivation meant life. For Mann had noted the contradiction implicit in Nietzsche's philosophy: the decadence of society could hardly be cured by an elitist artist whose very contempt for society undermined his own influence. The doctrine of aesthetic individualism was nothing less than the artist's own rancor against society. An artist who wishes to be a cultural reformer must fail if he cannot find his way to the people. These were the conclusions of Mann's autobiographical essay of 1905, and it was these conclusions which would lead Mann to his repudiation of Nietzsche in his essay of 1910, *Geist und Tat*.

Geist und Tat, or Spirit and Action, was first published in the literary journal *Pan*. It was an important influence on many among the literary intelligentsia, turning many away from aestheticism and individualism and toward political action. In this essay, Mann looked to France as a model, where politically active and socially critical intellectuals played a major role in leading their people to democracy. Mann commended the French literati for their part in the

French Revolution. Yet, according to Mann, the French literati had their task facilitated by the French people who, with literary instincts, trusted the reason of the poet. In Germany, where no such literary instinct prevailed among the people, the literati developed an elitist doctrine of self-cultivation. Instead of cultivating a great people, the German writer looked only to the great man. And although it is his nature to have contempt for power, to sacrifice utility for truth, Mann noted,

> The German writer, nevertheless, for decades worked for...the sophistic justification of injustice, for power, his deadly enemy. What uncommon decadence (Verderbnis) brought him to this? What does this say about Nietzsche and all his followers who loaned his services to this type?[14]

With his doctrine of power, Nietzsche had, at least inadvertently, worked for the benefit of his natural enemies. Now Mann called upon German writers to "become agitators in league with the people against power...that their nobility should no longer be a cult of the self."[15]

While there is no doubt that *Geist und Tat* represents a partial repudiation of Nietzsche, that repudiation, as previously noted, has frequently been misconstrued by some scholars who portray Mann as a born-again adherent of reason and democracy who turned away from the irrationalistic and anti-democratic hero of his youth, now recognized as the source of militarism and reaction in Germany. That portrayal is inaccurate. Mann did reject Nietzschean individualism in favor of political action, but only to accomplish the goal he always believed Nietzsche advocated: the cultural rebirth of Germany. More importantly, while Mann repudiated Nietzsche's anti-democratic teaching and even began to fear the influence of Nietzsche's irrational philosophy on German society, he never came to associate Nietzsche with the forces of militarism and reaction. In fact, long after *Geist und Tat,* Mann's thinking remained highly indebted to the hero of his youth.

Certainly Mann's predisposition toward the French intellectual tradition, expressed in *Geist und Tat,* coincided with Nietzsche's own preferences. This becomes clearer from Mann's 1915 essay, *Zola,* where he wrote that the

intellectual "is determined to put reason and humanity on the throne of the world and is so occupied that they appear to him already now the be the true powers...

> This was the common belief of the highest of Europe before it became imperialist. A short highpoint, but Ibsen and Nietzsche stand on it with Zola. 'Freedom and truth are the pillars of society' said the one; and the other appealed to Voltaire in order to philosophize about the Human all too Human.[16]

It is thus misleading when one author subtitles her work about Mann as "an overcoming of Nietzsche through the spirit of Voltaire". Nietzsche, in Mann's view, was of the same spirit, the same Geist, as Voltaire and Zola. Mann was evermore the activist artist, now criticizing Nietzsche with the latter's own critique of decadence. Nietzsche and Ibsen, he wrote, "learned to doubt and turn themselves away. The spirit for which they were responsible was finally only their own. They had only themselves; they mistrusted others."

Even Mann's new dedication to democracy retained a relationship to Nietzsche's aristocratic philosophy. For what is democracy, Mann wrote,

> the means for breeding the better and the best. Thus correctly understood, democracy can be the new aristocratic form. For every state needs its aristocracy, but one not rooted in birth and property; it will the ever-renewed aristocracy of those who demonstrate excellence for the nation.[17]

Clearly, Mann, in spite of his turn to political activism, still analyzed German society not in terms of class, but in terms of Nietzsche's psychological observations. *Der Untertan,* Mann's most critical appraisal of Wilhelmine society, was written in 1910-1911, thus at the time of *Geist und Tat*. Literary historians have noted that Wolfgang Buck, the respected liberal character of the novel, had become a decadent aesthete paralyzed by his own skepticism and critique of Wilhelmine society.[18] Less explored, however, is the relationship between Nietzsche's philosophy and Diedrich Hessling, the small factory owner and

member of the new bourgeoisie. This *Untertan* or "Little Superman," as one translator significantly chose to render the title in English, is the epitome of Nietzsche's notion of ressentiment. Hessling has no trace of an independent value system but finds his entire purpose in servility to the Emperor, in being a German national, in brutally exercising power over others. Nietzsche gave his most elaborate explanation of the theory of ressentiment in his *On the Genealogy of Morals,* a book Mann particularly singled out in later writings as having had an influence on him.[19]

Other commentators have argued that power-seekers like Hessling or Immanuel Rat, the tyrannical school teacher in Mann's novel, *Professor Unrat,* are meant to demonstrate the pernicious effects which Nietzsche's philosophy of power had on German society.[20] Yet one must be cautious in determining whether Mann blamed Nietzsche for German militarism or whether he blamed German militarist for distorting Nietzsche. It is true that in *Geist und Tat* Mann repudiated the doctrine of power, but in all his writings thereafter Mann distinguished between what Nietzsche meant by power and the exploitation of the concept by nationalist groups. He wrote of Nietzsche shortly after the First World War:

> His philosophic will to power gave wings to the German Reich. The object of his will to power was certainly greater than this. It was the spirit (Geist). Temporally, he, like Flaubert, would have desired the rule over an academy, not a group of armament factories and generals. Freedom from morality meant to him knowledge, not bestiality.[21]

Mann was to continue this guarded defense of Nietzsche even in his later writings, after the Nazi seizure of power. In his introduction to *The Living Thoughts of Nietzsche* and his article, "Nietzsche," both published in 1939, Mann observed that Nietzsche would sooner be an anarchist than a submissive citizen of the Reich. Some of Mann's other comments in these writings are interesting for the light they shed on how Mann and his generation understood Nietzsche's immoralism. He noted that Nietzsche did not dishonor Christianity so much as people who pretended to be Christians but no longer believed. Mann's further comments bear directly on the causes of Nietzsche's popularity in

turn-of-the-century Germany. He wrote:

> He (Nietzsche) demanded of himself that he 'think dangerously,' meaning by that without G-d, with truth as his ethics. But the 19th century, meanwhile, had become godless calmly and quietly through its materialistic science. It did not, however, believe it was 'thinking dangerously'. Scientists and philosophers were not in the habit of denying Christianity because inwardly they never grasped it...He (Nietzsche)...restored the questions of G-d and morals to its prime position. He brought those questions back to generations of young people, regardless of whether these young people followed or opposed him. Today it is forgotten that moral concepts were once a mere empty convention, countersigned by boredom. Nietzsche made them intensely interesting. Purposely or not, he made it possible for people to feel moral indignation without prejudice to intellectual standards.[22]

Mann even compares Nietzsche to Christ, and the reason for this comparison is most informative about Mann's repudiation of the philosopher in *Geist und Tat*. They differed in that Christ had faith in the next world while Nietzsche believed in this one. Their similarity was that both insisted on intuition as the source of knowledge, not the law. Intuition is, of course, the source of knowledge in Nietzsche's irrational philosophy of life. There is, then, no repudiation by Mann of Nietzsche's irrationalism in spite of the emphatic appeals to reason after 1910 and, even in this late essay, he goes so far as to suggest that young people of today and tomorrow return to the "grand seignior of the mind who considered Voltaire his peer...[and] learn from him the passion of the intuition."[23]

Mann, then, never gave up his attachment to Nietzsche's irrationalistic philosophy; his essay *Geist und Tat* repudiates only Nietzschean individualism. It was Nietzsche's aesthetic individualism, his elitism and skepticism, which, in Mann's view, prevented Nietzsche from accomplishing the goal of cultural renewal, a goal that Mann was later to attempt through political activism. The notion that Mann repudiated all of Nietzsche's philosophy is a mistaken assumption born as a consequence of the successful adoption of Nietzsche's

philosophy by the German right and the acquiescence of historians to that adoption.

True, Mann became increasingly wary of Nietzsche's philosophy after the successful appropriation of his philosophy by fascism. Yet his main criticism was that Nietzsche allowed himself to be misunderstood. If he wanted to teach the lesson of being true to oneself, then why use Cesare Borgia as an example and not Henry IV of France, whom Mann himself portrayed in a novel as a partisan of reason and self-mastery?[24] This criticism grew stronger by Mann's last work on the subject, written towards the end of the Second World War. In this account, Nietzsche was "double-faced" and "ambiguous". Nevertheless, he gave the Germans the choice to choose from his works: "the firm tendency or the questionable, the singularly genuine or the seductive. The Germans have chosen."[25]

END NOTES

1 See for example David Roberts, *Artistic Consciousness and Political Conscience: The Novels of Heinrich Mann, 1900–1938*, Bern and Frankfurt/M, 1971; Elke Emrich, Macht und Geist in Werk Heinrich Mann: Eine Überwindung Nietzsches aus dem Geist Voltaires, Berlin, 1981.

2 Seth Taylor, *Left-Wing Nietzscheans: The Politics of German Expressionism, 1910–1920,* Berlin, 1990.

3 On Nietzsche's influence on German artists and intellectuals in the 1890s see R. A. Nicholls, "Beginning of the Nietzsche Vogue in Germany," *Modern Philologie* 56 (1958–59); Roy Pascal, *From Naturalism to Expressionism: German Literature and Society, 1880–1918,* London, 1973; Richard Hinton Thomas, *Nietzsche in German Politics and Society, 1890–1918,* Manchester, 1985.

4 Heinrich Mann, *The Living Thoughts of Nietzsche*, New York, 1939, p. 1.

5 Roger A. Nicholls, "Heinrich Mann and Nietzsche" in *Modern Language Quarterly,* 21 (1960), 167.

6 Ibid., 170.

7   Heinrich Mann, "Eine Freundschaft: Gustav Flaubert und George Sand" in Essays, Hamburg (1960), 82–131.

8   Gottfried Benn "Rede auf Heinrich Mann" (1931) in Gesammelte Werke, Wiesbaden, 1959, 1:410; Wilhelm Herzog, Menschen denen ich begegnete, Bern, 1959, 253ff.

9   Nietzsche, *Nietzsche Contra Wagner,* "We antipodes".

10 Mann, "Eine Freundschaft," 100–101.

11 Ibid., 114.

12 Ibid., 109–110.

13 Ibid.

14 First published in *Pan,* 1 (1910-1911). *Geist und Tat* was reprinted in *Das Ziel* 1 (1915) 1–8 and *Das Forum* 6 (1921–22), 215–23. All quotations are from the copy in Mann's *Essays,* Hamburg, 1960.

15 *Geist und Tat,* 14.

16 "Zola" was first published in November, 1915 in Die Weissen Blätter and in several essay collections thereafter. The quotation comes from the Classen Verlag edition of Mann's Essays, p. 209. See also Mann's "Ein Zeitalter wird besichtigt," where he calls Nietzsche "the hater of the Reich" and "pupil of the French moralists." Dusseldorf, 1974, 169.

17 Heinrich Mann, "Der Tiefere Sinn der Republik," Essays, 548.

18 Renate Werner, *Skeptizismus, Ästhetizismus, Aktivismus Der frühe Heinrich Mann* (Dusseldorf: 1972), 105.

19 Mann praises *On the Genealogy of Morals* in his introduction to *The Living Thoughts of Nietzsche,* p. 19 and notes its influence on him in his *Eine Zeitalter wird besichtigt,* 182.

20 See Emrich, 188–201 and David Gross, "The Writer and Society: Heinrich Mann and Literary Politics in Germany, 1890–1940," Atlantic Highlands, 2980, 86-89.

21 "Kaiserreich und Republik" in Essays, 408–409. This essay was written in 1919 and appeared in *Macht und Mensch* of that same year.

22 Mann, *The Living Thoughts of Nietzsche,* 18–20.

23 Ibid., 32.

24 Ibid., 28; *Die Vollendung des Königs Henri Quatre,* Amsterdam, 1938. Nietzsche mentions Cesare Borgia several times in his later writings as a positive alternative to 19th century man. See, for example, *Beyond Good and Evil,* 197.

25 Mann, "Eine Zeitalter wird besichtigt," 182.

Nuclear Forces in the Twenty-First Century

Baruch Schwartz ('18)

With the end of the Cold War, the United States and the Russian Federation have had to come to grips with their unwieldy nuclear arsenals. The cost of the arms race is seen to be a reason the Soviet Union fell and resulted in several billion dollars of debt for the United States. Now with the United States facing threats of much lower intensity than the Cold War, the question to ask is whether the United States needs a nuclear arsenal anymore. And if one is needed, what remains to be determined is what number of warheads should be maintained to be most effective at the least cost.

The first consideration is almost moot, as the unilateral elimination of all nuclear weapons isn't a viable modern policy. This is due to the official reason the United States has nuclear weapons—deterrence. Due to the fact that the international system is "anarchic"[1]—the system lacks structure—it lacks that classic ability of government: to impose its will on another even when he doesn't want it. Due to the inability of treaties to resolve many of the issues in the world, governments naturally resort to conflict. The idea behind deterrence is to make a conflict so destructive that no country would want to engage in one, and that idea holds just as true now as it did during the Cold War.

The next proposal on nuclear arms control was to restrict nuclear weapons in such a way that no country could use them the way that the United States used them on Japan. The destructive power of the atomic bomb had shocked the

world, and no nation wanted to be on the receiving end of such devastation. Bernard Baruch proposed his namesake plan to place control of all nuclear devices, lethal and otherwise, in the hands of an International Atomic Development Authority. This authority was supposed to control the production, use, and deployment of all types of nuclear devices. Such a supranational body would have been above the control of the United Nations Security Council to insure that the petty vetoes of the five permanent members couldn't derail the project. This was in the best interests of all countries in the United Nations at the time. However, when the Soviet Union was informed of the proposal during a session devoted to it, they indicated a refusal to accept the proposal unless they would retain veto power and the ability to abolish all weapons prior to its enforcement. The United States was understandably not willing to accept these terms, and the plan fell through.

In analyzing the history of nuclear negotiations, there is a school of thought that the Americans should have accepted the Baruch proposal even with the Soviet demands; presumably, if they had, there would have been a de-escalation of nuclear tensions across the globe. This suggestion is probably false. At that point in time the USSR had already seen to beginning the arms race through the espionage of Klaus Fuchs and others like him. Furthermore, the arms race didn't occur in a vacuum; it occurred due to major ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, which the proposal would not resolve.

The facts remain that the Baruch Plan failed, as did every other wide and sweeping arms control attempt since then, due a combination of aiming for that which was impossible at the time (the hatred between the USSR and the USA was just beginning) and the *international system itself*. The way that the system worked and works today is that no country wants to look a hundred or even fifty years down the line. Exacerbating this is the fact that since a nation-state isn't looking so far into the future, it doesn't have a good prediction of who its allies will be. It therefore may not want to eliminate nuclear weapons from any country in case that country later becomes their ally. Unless an equilibrium in war and peace has been reached, there is no incentive for the great powers to restrict themselves, nor for the weaker ones to listen

to restrictions. The Hague Convention of 1899, which prohibited expanding bullets and repeated the ban on exploding bullets, displayed the progress that can come to the rules of war when the fighting style remains stagnant. However, when the style of war changes as dramatically as it has during the middle of the twentieth century, there will always be states that don't want to accept the responsibility of caring for future generations.

Since the end of the Baruch Plan there have been calls for unilateral disarmament. The belief is that the disarmament of the United States would lead to the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world. The rationale behind this is that if the United States had no weapons, the Russians and other countries wouldn't need them to deter against an American nuclear strike. Proponents of this belief are attempting to ignore the basic fact that the United States as a rational actor will not give up the most effective guarantor of its security. There are four stated goals of the United States military in regards to nuclear weapons, all of which can be put under the umbrella term deterrence. There is currently no weapon that can equal the destructive capacity of a nuclear weapon; it would be foolish to think that the Americans would give up this massive power just for a *potential* disarmament. A further consideration that many in the unilateral disarmament community fail to take into account is that should the deterrent fail in its duties, there comes a necessity to "decisively defeat"[2] the enemy in a "nuclear war." Should any other country retain nuclear weapons while the leading world power, the US, would lack them, disaster could result. No weapon can do the damage that a single small thermonuclear bomb can do in an instant to any target.

With the fact that the nuclear "deterrent" is in all likelihood to remain in the United States' arsenal for the next half century at a minimum, as new bombers and missile submarines are being constructed, the Pentagon must consider: how can the US get the most effectiveness out of the fewest number of warheads?

This is really a three part question. Firstly, acknowledging the fact that the necessity of deterrence outweighs the possible advantages of not having an arsenal is one thing, but what size arsenal is needed? Secondly, how should

the weapons be distributed amongst the members of the military triad (the US Army, Navy, and Air Force), and should any weapons be banned? Thirdly, what countries is the arsenal supposed to be a deterrent to?

To answer the first part of the question, there is massive overkill in the way the United States has used the arsenal in the past. This fact has been realized in how the numbers of warheads in active service has declined since peak numbers were reached in 1967 with 31,225 warheads. The New START treaty signed by President Obama and President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev capped the number of deployed (usable) warheads at 1,550 for both countries. The result (as of this writing) is a reduction in the number of warheads to a level which both governments maintain is reasonable. However, this is probably still a needlessly high number, as the massive power these warheads have in contrast with their Second World War counterparts, as well as the much increased accuracy of the delivery vehicles for those warheads, results in even 1,550 warheads being excessive. The American government does not need to kill every man and woman between St. Petersburg and Moscow, for war is, as Clausewitz famously observed, "politics by other means." With this in mind, enough weapons to devastate six to ten cities is more than sufficient to prove that the American government is serious. Only a small number of warheads are needed to do this. That number, based on the Nukemap simulation, is around three hundred to five hundred warheads in the range of 500 kilotons (500,000 tons of TNT).

For the second question, the triad (the three pronged approach to nuclear weapon deployment) remains effective, although it may have some drawbacks. The Nuclear Posture Review Report put out by the Obama administration said that "each leg of the Triad has advantages that warrant retaining all three legs at this stage of reductions." These legs are the nuclear land-based missile force (ICBMs), the sea-based missile force (SLBMs) and the air-based nuclear force (known as bombers). While bombers would seem to be obsolete in the age of hypersonic Mach-25 missiles capable of reaching speeds close to 20,000 miles per hour, at least a quarter of all nuclear weapons should be placed on bombers nonetheless. The reason for this is because a bomber can be recalled and can show strength by means of forward basing (being placed, literally, forward

of the country firing them), while other weapon systems cannot. In conjunction with wanting to keep the casualties of a nuclear exchange down, there is a massive tactical benefit inherent in having the ability to recall weapons before they are dropped, something which land-based missiles lack.

Land-based missiles encourage something that isn't very good when a government is trying to keep body counts down. This is the idea that if the American or Russian governments don't use their ICBMs, they will lose them through the targeting of a rival country and not have the capacity to retaliate and enforce their will should it come to nuclear war. This in turn leads to each side putting its nuclear arsenal on warning status—ready to launch at the moment there is warning the enemy will—to destroy the enemy's forces and eliminate their ability to fight a nuclear war. Up until the 1980s ICBMs were the most accurate way of delivering a nuclear weapon. This was to be used to attack enemy ICBMs in a counterforce (anti-weapon) strike.

However, times change and now the absolute king of nuclear war, the only weapon system worth mentioning for first and second strikes along with counterforce and countervalue (anti-population) attacks, are the SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles). These are the ultimate weapons for almost any of the possible situations that could arise in the pursuit of nuclear diplomacy or usage of nuclear weapons. They also have a massive bonus that no other nuclear weapon has: namely, the ability for a boomer (nuclear submarine) to stay hidden for a period up to and including three months at sea wherein no detection device can locate them. They are, for all intents and purposes, invulnerable to any weapon known to humanity, as no weapon can hit what it cannot target.

The only type of nuclear weapon that should be banned is the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). This weapon is difficult to detect due to its small size and space-based nature; it reenters faster than a regular missile, meaning that it is a first or second strike weapon against which the only defense is to either shoot it down or strike and knock out the control center before it is launched. It is simply too destructive to achieve political aims, and using it would result in a useless, devastating total war.

Finally the third question: what countries is the United States planning on using its deterrent force against? The country the US is most likely to use nuclear arms against is North Korea, seeing as if and when they develop a nuclear weapon they will almost certainly use them on countries under United States protection. Russia and China, along with Iran, may be autocracies, but they don't have a death wish. They will not attack the United States unless something goes horribly wrong in the international system, and therefore they aren't likely threats for the foreseeable future.

Nuclear weapons are going to be an integral part of the United States arsenal for at least a century to come, and will most likely consist of a nuclear dyad of SLBMs and heavy bombers. The arsenal should be targeted at likely threats and will not need a launch on warning posture due to the removal of many ICBMs from the inventory. A maximum of 500 warheads of 500 kilotons each should be in the arsenal, now reduced by more than two-thirds, and only FOBS-type weapons should be totally excluded. This arsenal configuration should be enough to force the enemies of the United States to negotiate and avoid nuclear war. This can be accomplished all while limiting needless destruction without causing political impotence.

END NOTES

1   Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946–1976* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

2   U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine For Joint Nuclear Operations,* Joint Publication 3–12, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), vii.

Population Growth in the American South and Biblical Egypt

Mr. Murray Sragow

It is tempting for those who study American History to assume that it is normal for slave populations to naturally increase, meaning that the birthrate of the slaves outpaces the mortality rate. After all, this was certainly the case regarding African-Americans in the centuries prior to Emancipation. A total of less than half a million slaves were imported into North America, but by 1776, when the Declaration of Independence was signed,[1] there were already close to 600,000 slaves,[2] and by 1860, on the eve of the Civil War, the number had grown to almost four million.[3] This number excludes close to 500,000[4] free African Americans, who were all either freed directly or descendants of freed slaves. It is therefore fair to say that over the first "four score and seven" years of the United States, the natural increase of the slave population of the United States was 750%. Absent any contrary data, the student of American History would logically assume that this is a normal phenomenon, and that slave populations tend to grow over time.

Readers of the Torah would arrive at the same conclusion when examining the growth of the Jewish slave population in biblical Egypt. The Torah reports that the number of Jews entering Egypt was 70[5] and those exiting was around 600,000.[6] The Torah is unclear about how much time it took for this growth to occur, and it is also unclear about how much of this growth occurred prior to the Jews' enslavement. But the Torah clearly indicates that whatever growth occurred prior to enslavement continued during slavery.[7] This growth is again

alluded to by the census figures in Numbers. There the count of first-born males is 22,273[8] out of a population of over 600,000 males. That means that only one out of 27 or so is a first-born, suggesting huge families. If indeed the average family had 27 children that survived to adulthood, that would further explain the tremendous population growth.[9]

Research shows, however, that these two cases are the exception, not the rule.[10] The more common case is the one found among slave populations in the Caribbean, where the mortality rate exceeded the birth rate.[11] The mortality rate was so high that slave owners needed to constantly import new slaves in order to replenish their stock, in contrast to the slaveholding areas of the United States where the high slave birth rate made this unnecessary. Though the end of the transatlantic slave trade meant the doom of slavery in the Caribbean, it was hardly felt in the United States. Between 1807, when the United States banned slave trading, and 1860, the slave population quadrupled.[12]

In addressing the question of why the natural increase in the United States was so high, it would be instructive to consider why the rate in the Caribbean was so low. This might also be useful when thinking about the case of the Israelites in Egypt, since if the case there is more similar to the U.S. than to the Caribbean it could help explain the population explosion there.[13]

Philip D. Curtin suggests that the critical issue among Caribbean slaves was the high death rate, not a low birth rate. The reason for this is an epidemiological vicious cycle.[14] He argues that there was some initial importation of a large quantity of African slaves, and the overwhelming majority of them died because of their exposure to the disease environment in the Caribbean. When the slaves died out, they would be hastily replaced by a new batch of slaves, who would suffer the same high mortality due to the same exposure.[15] This contrasts well with the case of African slaves in the United States. Since the demand for large quantities of slaves did not materialize until the cotton gin made large scale production of cotton possible in the early 1800s, by then the slave population had become immune to European and Native American diseases. They were therefore a stable population, no longer experiencing a high death rate. In the case of the Israelites in Egypt, it is unlikely that there was

even a need for a new immunity. There was significant communication be-
tween Canaan and Egypt, as Canaan lay along the main trading routes going
north and east. Therefore, lacking any epidemiological mortality problem, the
Israelite population was able to explode immediately upon entry. In both the
United States and biblical Egypt, because the slave population was allowed to
remain constant, epidemiology was not a cause of an unusually high mortality
rate and therefore not a factor limiting population growth.

A second suggestion is offered by Orlando Patterson, based on his study of
Jamaica.[16] Patterson believes that the most significant factor depressing the
birth rate was the active influence of the slave owners in the Caribbean. Their
business model assumed a steady supply of cheap slaves coming from Africa,
and therefore there was no need to breed their own slaves. Given this fact, they
would import mainly men (who could labor more productively), and they
would discourage pregnancy among the women because it would cause them
to be less productive. Jamaican planters would therefore punish women who
became pregnant and discourage them from caring for those babies that were
born.

This contrasts significantly with the experience of Southern planters in the
United States. They viewed their slaves not only as a labor source but as assets.
This can be seen from studies showing that slaves in the US had better nutri-
tion and therefore greater average height than Africans anywhere else in the
world.[17] The simplest explanation for this phenomenon is that their masters
fed them well, presumably because stronger and healthier slaves were more
productive and would fetch a higher price in the market. Similarly, the Three-
Fifths Compromise in the U.S. Constitution, which counted slaves toward the
population for the purpose of determining a state's representation (and, there-
by, political power), demonstrates an appreciation by the Southerners of the
importance of maintaining and, if possible, increasing their slave population.
It is understandable why slave owners in the United States *encouraged* their
slaves to reproduce, especially after the slave trade dried up.[18]

Such was clearly not the case in biblical Egypt. The productivity of the Israel-
ite slaves was of minimal interest to their masters,[19] and therefore it would not

have been in their interest to feed them well or encourage their reproduction. In fact, given that enslavement was a response to population explosion, the opposite is true.[20] However, there is an important similarity between the Israelites and the African-American slaves. Initially upon their entrance to Egypt in Joseph's time, the Israelites were not only welcomed, but in fact were given the fertile Goshen area in which to live. So while the rationale was not the same (initially Egypt was not interested in Israelite labor at all), in both cases the environment was ripe for population increase.

Tadman's main reason for the population decrease in the Caribbean, however, comes from his study of sugar plantations in Louisiana. He demonstrates that in Louisiana, unlike everywhere else in the United States, the slave population diminished over time.[21] Far from being merely coincidentally similar to the Caribbean islands in that both were producing sugar, the nature of the job was actually the most significant issue. The labor requirements of producing sugar, as opposed to cotton or tobacco in the old South, were so significant as to diminish population at a rate similar to the Caribbean even though the epidemiological and business incentive differences remained. There were multiple reasons for this: the work itself was considered too difficult for women to do, which meant that there was little incentive for slave owners to import them; those few women that were imported had to work so hard that it made it difficult for them to bear healthy children; and even the men were worn out by the harsh labor, leading to much higher mortality than in the cotton states. All of this mirrored the situation in the sugar-producing plantations in the Caribbean.

None of these causes of population decrease existed in the Deep South. Cotton is a much easier crop to produce, for a variety of reasons. It does not require the yearly preparation that sugar does, it is less strenuous to harvest, and it has a much longer shelf-life. This means that it is less labor intensive, less rushed, and much more able to be done by women. Therefore, as opposed to the sugar plantations, the slave population was much more evenly divided by gender, and because there was useful work available, there were many more children.

Biblical Egypt, however, would seem to be much more similar to the sugar

plantation model. First of all, the labor was clearly taxing, as the Torah repeatedly testifies.[22] Second, there is no evidence of labor being performed by women.[23] Lastly, as opposed to the American south, where slave boys were set to work as soon as they were physically able, slave boys in Egypt were targets for extermination. For all of these reasons, Tadman would presumably argue that in failing to follow the form of the sugar plantations in Louisiana and the Caribbean, the Israelite experience in Egypt was indeed miraculous.

In conclusion, it can be reasonably argued that the cases of slave population increase in the cotton plantations of the southern United States and in biblical Egypt are exceptions to the general rule. Slave populations tend to decrease over time, for epidemiological-, business-, and labor-related reasons. In the case of the southern United States, various causes led to a diminished effect of these factors, leading to population growth. But in the case of biblical Egypt, many of the factors limiting growth did indeed exist and there were even additional reasons to expect the population to diminish, but nonetheless it grew incredibly. It is therefore quite reasonable to call that increase miraculous.

END NOTES

1 The irony of Jefferson's language ("all men are created equal, and endowed by their creator with...liberty") need not be elaborated upon.

2 *Slave, Free Black, and White Population, 1780–1830,* http://userpages.umbc.edu/~bouton/History407/SlaveStats.htm.

3 *The Civil War Home Page,* http://www.civil-war.net/census.asp?census=Total.

4 Ibid.

5 Genesis 46:7–27.

6 Exodus 12:37–38. Presumably, neither of these numbers are intended by the Torah to be exhaustive. The initial list includes almost no women, and the population at Exodus includes only adult males of military age. It excludes the elderly, young, and women.

7 The Torah describes the Israelites' increase rate while slaves in Exodus 1:12, where it discusses the effect of the bondage. Since the Egyptians' stated reason for the enslavement was their large population, the Torah makes a point that the growth rate

did not decline while the Israelites were slaves. There it says (translations are from the Artscroll Stone *Chumash*) *"But as much as they [the Egyptians] would afflict it [the Jewish People], so it would increase and so it would spread out,"* which either means that the increase rate remained constant or that it grew. Rashi ad loc., for example, quotes a *midrash* that presents this as a Divine response to the Egyptians. They were hoping to reduce the population through slavery, and instead the reverse happened. This seems to imply that the rate increased. Ibn Ezra, however, interprets the verse as simply maintaining under slavery the same rate of increase that existed prior.

8   Numbers 3:43.

9   R. Laizer Gordon, rabbi of Telz in Lithuania at the turn of the 20th century, points to this statistic as proof of the truth of the famous *midrash* quoted by Rashi in Ex. 1:7. Rashi claims that the sixfold repetitive language there *("The Children of Israel were fruitful, teemed, increased, and became strong—very, very much so")* is a hint to common six-birth pregnancies. If Israelite women were indeed giving birth to sextuplets, it would help explain the astounding family size, as it would take only five pregnancies to produce the 27 child average. Furthermore, this would also explain how the Israelite population was able to explode in a very short time. According to the shortest time frame presented in Rabbinic sources, the entire period lasted only four generations. In order for the population to increase from 70 to 600,000 in that small a period, it would require 21 children per family, again in the same ballpark.

10   The excellent work of Michael Tadman both summarizes and analyzes the research current as of the date he wrote. His article "The Demographic Cost of Sugar" in *The American Historical Review* 105:5 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) is a must-read on this topic.

11   This was presumably the hope of the Biblical Egyptians, as well. Ex. 1:9 quotes the Egyptian king as saying *"Behold! the people, the Children of Israel, are more numerous and stronger than we,"* meaning that his justification for enslaving the Israelites was their tremendous population, and his plan was to reduce both their size and power in this way. Given Tadman's research, the Egyptian plan was a reasonable one, and therefore the opposite result can be fairly claimed by Jewish tradition as miraculous.

12   Website of Faculty of Weber University, http://faculty.weber.edu/kmackay/statistics_on_slavery.html.

13   Of course, one could simply say that the Israelite experience in Egypt was miraculous and therefore requires no further explanation. For the sake of this discussion, we prefer to suggest that having the miracle employ natural means does not lessen its

impressiveness, and therefore it is worth considering the extent to which the factors that explain American slave population growth might also have existed in Biblical Egypt.

14 Philip D. Curtin, "Epidemiology and the Slave Trade," *Political Science Quarterly* 83:190–216 (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1968).

15 This is a reverse of the experience of Native Americans when exposed to Europeans who were carrying smallpox. In contrast to that case, in which the diseases carried by the Europeans were far more lethal than those carried by the Native Americans, here the diseases carried by African slaves were far less lethal. Perhaps this was due to the local population having developed immunities due to their repeated exposure to slaves from the same part of Africa. Each group of Africans, however, was encountering America for the first time.

16 Orlando Patterson, *The Sociology of Slavery: An Analysis of the Origins, Development, and Structure of Negro Slave Society in Jamaica* (New Jersey: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976).

17 Ray Rees, et al., *The Puzzle of Slave Heights in Antebellum America* (1999). http://cliometrics.org/conferences/ASSA/Jan_99/rees.shtml.

18 Tadman (note 20) additionally argues that slave owners in many cases actually bred slaves for sale, especially in the 1800s. Slave owners in the upper South, where the land was less productive, found it more lucrative to sell their slaves into the Deep South or West than to use their labor on their worn-out soil. The business model, then, was based on slave reproduction.

19 This can be further seen by Pharaoh's insistence on the slaves supplying their own straw to make bricks in Ex. 5:7. If productivity were a primary concern, the Israelites would have been punished by an increase in the output demand. Additionally, the *midrash* relates how the Egyptians would assign useless work to the Jews just to keep them busy, such as constructing buildings on sand foundations which would topple soon after only to be rebuilt.

20 If the *midrash* is to be taken as factual report, there is ample evidence of Egyptian action to reduce the population. The *midrash* quoted in the Passover Haggadah on *"And [G-d] saw our affliction"* (Deuteronomy 26:7), for example, claims that Egyptians deliberately separated husbands and wives. Furthermore, Pharaoh's efforts to kill Israelite male babies (Ex. 1:16 and 22), while not clearly explained in the text, certainly could only affect population in the negative.

21 Tadman, p. 1542 and following.

22   Over and over again, the Torah emphasizes the back-breaking nature of the labor, as well as that being the primary goal of the labor. See Ex. 1:11—*"in order to afflict it [the Jewish People] with their burdens"* and 1:14—*"They [the Egyptians] embittered their lives with hard work ... All their labors ... were with crushing hardness."*

23   On the contrary, many Passover Haggadah commentaries interpret that by eating *charoset* made with apples, Jews recall how the Israelite women in Egypt would venture out into the fields where their husbands were laboring in order to seduce them.

Romantics, Race and Modernity:
Germanness and the Jewish Questions between Volk and Rasse

Mr. Joel Pinsker

The early 20th-century pamphleteer Hans Goldzier (1861–?) claimed that parents should refrain from feverishly kissing their children so as to avoid sucking the latter's "life current" (*Lebensstrom*) from them. He designated this electrical current as the "motor" of races and peoples. In his view, those races with the stronger "electricity" prevail, in social-Darwinist fashion, over the weaker, and those lacking "life breath" (*Lebensod*) are naturally disposed to feed parasitically on those with more of it, those with stronger "electricity."[1]

Adolf Hitler later claimed that the scientific community's lack of approval for such theories made Goldzier's pronouncements on the natural world all the more legitimate. Goldzier's spite towards scientific convention, in Hitler's view, put him in a class with Galileo.[2] Yet once in power, the Nazi party developed its own strict guidelines for *upholding* "scientific" standards *against* völkish, "esoteric" explanations of race.[3] Views like Goldzier's, which would pass "scientific" muster in the National Socialist milieu, appear plainly non-materialist and unscientific. They nonetheless signaled a discourse negotiating between anti-intellectual, romantic-völkist narratives, on the one hand, and scientific-progressive materialism, on the other.

Romantic nationalism and scientific racism, by the early 20th century, were not clearly distinct spheres, but shared overlapping tendencies. Over the

course of the late nineteenth century and amid the emergence of nationalism in Europe, naturalist reactionaries, Marxist-materialists, Social Democrats, liberals and imperialists offered competing claims on modernity that variously reappropriated and offered counter-narratives to the romantic worldviews of Herder, Fichte and Schopenhauer. These claims' proponents appeared in three general varieties:

1) Romantic völkists, who insisted that reviving and cultivating the German spirit—*Geist*—was the most urgent and virtuous task.

2) Progressive materialists, who held that Enlightenment's greatest legacy was in modern science and empiricism, and that these would solve the riddle of the modern condition.

3) Monists, who saw the hope of modernity and progress in science, while using its categories to buttress an obscurantist, mystical religion.

The first decades of the 20th century in Germany were thus a dissonant mixture of progressive, reactionary, scientific and mystical ideology that frequently overlapped in counterintuitive ways. The competing conceptions of modernity they offered left no inevitable "winner" in sight. Such a view runs contrary to arguments that frame this milieu as a manichean struggle between scientific-materialist progress on the one hand and racist-obscurantist reaction on the other, from which the latter victoriously emerged and culminated in the National Socialists' rise to power. Rather than following a linear, inevitable path, the ideological currents at work in this setting sometimes competed and sometimes were aligned. In some cases liberalism and imperialism, or pacifism and eugenics thrived together.[4] Examining how thinkers imagined Germanness and understood the role of Jews and Jewishness in relation to it provides a useful lens into the national imagination of the German *fin-de-siecle* and how it defies modern categories and sensibilities about such matters.

Near the end of the 19th century, völkish anti-Semitic authors such as Paul De Lagarde and Julius Langbehn wrote immensely popular polemics offering quasi-religious, ethnic-revivalist and naturalistic reactions to modernity based in romantic conceptions of humanity. At the turn of the century, the Darwinist zoologist Ernst Haeckel created his "Monistic religion," a vitalistic

but *materialist* philosophy that, paradoxically, argued there was an all-encompassing *spirit* of the universe evident in the Darwinian model of evolution that he championed.[5] Later, the influential feminist activist and philosopher Gertrud Bäumer, with her advocacy of both pacifism and eugenics, exemplified ways in which the völkish impulse could be bound up with values of modernity and progress.[6] All of these thinkers imagined Germanness and Jewishness in ways that appear variously inclusive, progressive, reactionary and chauvinistic. In a sense, they were all of them and none of them. Rather than heroes and villains in a left-right morality play, these thinkers moved within a distinctive continuum of romantic humanism, nativist resentment and materialist progressivism.

The first half of the present study focuses on the völkish-romantic works of Langbehn and De Lagarde, examining the interplay of reactionary and progressive "scientific" conceptions of Germanness and Jewishness. Using the same lens, the second half examines some of the chief writings of Ernst Haeckel, and couples this with analysis of the still-unresolved historiographic debates around how his philosophy should be contextualized in the milieu where it became popular. This approach combines close examination of the primary texts in question with a broader view of the interpretive controversies that have surrounded them.

I. Germans and Jews: Nobility and Difference

Paul de Lagarde (1827–1891) and Julius Langbehn (1851–1907) both represented illiberal extremes of romantic völkism. They channeled what Fritz Stern called "essentially unpolitical grievances," suspicious of, if not opposed to, the dull proceduralism of modern scientific rigor and parliamentary statecraft.[7] With characteristically romantic faith in the primacy of feeling over reason, they declared their commitment to forging Germanic consciousness through cultural revival, a revival grounded in a connection to a "natural" German *Geist* and in antagonism towards imagined national others.

These writers knew their enlightened enemy well. German science offered an

astonishing array of innovation and productivity in this period, and by the second half of the nineteenth century, a strong tradition of popular science, infused with progressive, rationalist Enlightenment values, had made a wide impression among Germans.[8] In the shifting place of both Germanness and Jews in these writers' evolving Germanic ideologies, and in their arguments about Jewish otherness, we can observe the interplay of new scientific and older romantic German-nationalist discourses.

De Lagarde, a prolific scholar of ancient Eastern languages and the Bible, prized imagination and intuition over methodical rigor. He held modern natural science (*Naturwissenschaft*) to be an unworthy pursuit compared with the humanities (*Geisteswissenschaft*).[9] In his essays "Lipman und Seine Verehrer" and "Juden und Indogermanen," which appeared in his collected *Mittheilungen,* De Lagarde laid bare his conception of Germanness and its relationship to Jews and Judaism. The grounds of his anti-Semitism were ambiguous; he flirted with racial categories, only to quickly dismiss them as inferior to Geist. He went so far as to reprimand Jews for their own claims to racial purity on these grounds, invoking a mythical, idealized Jewishness he was willing to "love":

> In the Jews, we are prepared to love that which is worthy of love—that is to say, that which is unique and authentic—in their now admittedly vanished religion. We ignore the Jews who boast the sublimity of their race, when this race has wasted away over two millennia in spiritual and temperamental impoverishment, when for us "race" only holds weight for horses, cattle and sheep...[10]

Coupled with his ridicule of racial categories, De Lagarde's barb about modern Jews' piety—"what is unique and authentic—in their admittedly long-vanished religion"—suggests a qualified anti-Semitism, wherein Jews' presence theoretically needn't threaten German interests, if Jews could only limit themselves to those ("admittedly long-vanished") aspects of Jewishness he found palatable. Even where he conceded that the Jewish question concerned race, his use of "race" (Rasse) lacked the concrete, essentializing meaning later "scientific" anti-Semites would give it. For him, "race"—a word that appears

all of eight times in the entire two-volume, 782-page Mittheilungen—was subservient to the spirit of German idealism that prized Geist above all else.[11]

Non-determinist qualifications notwithstanding, De Lagarde's vehemence toward Jews and the language he employed to express it suggest he was informed partly by the deterministic, "scientific" racism that took its cue from social Darwinism and was gaining popularity in the late 19th century. De Lagarde pushed the boundaries of a romantic anti-Semitism to its epistemic limits, employing scientific tropes in his more virulent outbursts but calmly reassuring his readers elsewhere in his writing that he was no racial determinist. He claimed to like many individual Jews and even that he had defended Jewry as a whole against one particularly nefarious one.[12] But when it came to the very Jewishness of Jews, the notion that they had any claim on the Bible or had a distinct tradition was, *petitio principii,* rendered illegitimate by the existence of a the New Testament and the Church.[13] Individual Jews may have appeared non-threatening, yet he despised the ideas of Jewry and of Judaism for their very claims of difference: "Friendship is possible with every individual Jew, though to be sure only under the provision that he ceases to be a Jew; Jewishness as such must vanish."[14] It is in this same passage where De Lagarde's romantic anti-Semitism—not against Jews per se but against the essence of Jewishness—then becomes inflected with the scientistic tropes of his time. Animated by a limited, romantic-nationalist conception of compassion, De Lagarde lambasted his modern, liberal opponents who saw the evils of modern capitalism, yet prevented from taking the necessary drastic measures against its supposedly chief purveyors by their own perverted sense of humanity:

> It would require a heart of stone...not to hate the Jews, not to hate and scorn those who—out of humanity!—are too cowardly to stamp out this rampant [wuchernde][15] pest. Trichinae and bacilli are not negotiated with...they also are not educated...[but rather] exterminated quickly and as thoroughly [as possible]."[16]

De Lagarde held up a competing conception of human kindness against the risible "humanity" of his opponents. A romantic spirit thus animated his aver-

sion to Jewish modernity and difference, and accommodated his idealized Jews, however inflected it was at times by the scientism of his day. In such spirit, he invoked compassion during this violent and hateful manifestation of his anti-Semitism. Idealistic categories that held out against strict racial determinism restrained De Lagarde's vituperation, and these same categories framed his hatred. He could conceive of a Germany that accommodated assimilated Jews, on the one hand, and could ride the rising ideological tide of the "racial" dehumanization of Jews, on the other. As Stanley Zucker has noted, "This was the seedtime of modern anti-Semitism, but it was also the most optimistic period for the proponents of assimilation."[17] Much of the former, along with some of the latter, are present in De Lagarde's work.

Julius Langbehn was less shy about the term *Rasse* than De Lagarde. For Langbehn it was also a word increasingly available in the existing discourse around the Jewish question. Throughout his immensely successful *Rembrandt als Erzieher* (1890) *(Rembrandt as Educator),* he used *Rasse* interchangeably with *Volk*,[18] while spending much of the book expressing disdain for the *Wissenschaft* that had so effectively legitimized *Rasse* as a human category.

In *Rembrandt als Erzieher,* Langbehn attempted to define Germanness in accordance with an anti-intellectual, aesthetic-naturalist ethos. For Langbehn, as for his romantic forbear Fichte,[19] *Volkstum* was transcendent of political boundaries, as evident in his designation of the Dutch Rembrandt as an ideal German. Langbehn marked off the German from the non-German based on a distinctive "irregularity" and "individuality" that was attuned to nature. To be sure, such "individuality" was informed more by a Herderian sense of *Volk*-specific humanity than by a universal, enlightenment-based humanity. It referred not to individuals or citizens, but to a Germanic *Volk* defined by "ugly," unpredictable, non-rational and unrefined cultural characteristics:

... Rafael's skull and his works are characterized by clean lines; Beethoven's skull and works, unclean lines. But unclean lines do not lack beauty...the German skull is the best, the most fruitful for Germany, and this is precisely what the Rembrandtian aesthetic has over the Rafaelian... The quality of the German skull, art and spirit is notably higher.[20]

This distinction undergirded Langbehn's titular argument—that Rembrandt best exemplified the ideal German type. This argument relied in large part on an aesthetic appraisal of the latter's work, one which distinguished German art and "Germanness" itself from Western standards of beauty embodied in the Italian Renaissance. He identified this virtuous German "irregularity" in contrast to the "symmetry" and "elegance" of the decadent Westerners from whom his Germans were distinct.[21] His romantic conception of German Geist indicated a far narrower and more vague ethnic chauvinism than that of later popular reactionaries. (The latter would include ancient Persians, Hindus and Greeks under the anthropological rubric of superior "Aryans," naturally contraposed to a "Semitic" enemy.[22]) Langbehn's central contention throughout his polemic was that Germanness was defined by a supra-political, diasporic *"Volk,"* one with a rough-hewn, anti-intellectual, artistic spirit. This individualistic spirit was found in everyday, commonplace art, which the elite academic specialists and modernists of Langbehn's day foolishly dismissed from atop their perches.[23]

Langbehn expressed his ideas about Jews in explicitly anti-materialist, non-racial terms. This antagonism was similar to De Lagarde's, though less violent and obsessive, and Langbehn placed far more emphasis on the idealized Jews he approved of than on the stock-market speculators *(Börsenjobber)* he detested.[24] Just as De Lagarde had his acceptable Jews, Langbehn romanticized a mythical "noble Jewry" that was proud of such pedigree and unabashedly parochial. Langbehn's völkish categories were less absolute than De Lagarde's, preventing Langbehn from verging into biological-deterministic categories. At the same time, Langbehn did claim that Jewishness marked Jews as a "people" distinct from Germans, and this distinction was not merely their parochialism that De Lagarde so detested. In fact, Langbehn attributed the same romantic "individualism" of a proper German—which allowed him to be "human, because he is German"—to an ideal, "noble" Jew, exemplified in Disraeli's famed self-promotional rhetoric. This nobility had nonetheless degenerated with modernity, as it had for De Lagarde:

> An authentic and orthodox Jew has something unmistakably distinctive
> about him; he belongs to that age-old, moral and spiritual aristocracy,

from which most modern Jews have strayed; with this hindsight, then, Lord Beaconsfield[25] seemed half-correct, when he declared them the world's oldest nobility...Rembrandt's Jews were authentic Jews, who wanted to be nothing else but Jews, and who therefore had character. He was interested in the aristocratic Jews, not the plebeian ones...[26]

Langbehn did not take issue with Jewish claims of particularity in principle, as De Lagarde did. On the contrary, it at least appears from the above passage that the more particularly Jewish, the better. At the same time, the only specific German Jews he approved of were assimilated, "noble" Christians. This suggests it was not truly Jewish difference he admired, but rather how sufficiently individual Jews represented illiberalism and opposed modernity, thus proving their vaguely defined "nobility."

Accordingly, Langbehn equated his Jewish contemporaries with all that was un-German, in his view, about modernity. Later anti-Semites, such as Houston Chamberlain and his followers, frequently supported their views with "biological" arguments about ineffable racial qualities of Germans and Jews. But along with his "noble Jews," Langbehn recommended an "aristocratic anti-Semitism," which allowed him to heap praise on "authentic" pious Jews of Rembrandt's paintings as well as German-Jewish converts to Christianity such as Rahel Varnhagen and Ludwig Börne, "who only conserved a noble, abstract Judaism." Accordingly, he warned against the "plebeian" anti-Semitism that failed to make this distinction.[27]

But he reserved tremendous scorn for the modern, cosmopolitan Jews of the Berlin and Vienna salons, Jews to whom he attributed German cultural decay:

Just as in politics, so too in art must we distinguish the healthy from the rotting. The *wicked* Jewish character that is so sympathetic to Zola is, like the latter, completely contrary to the German essence."[28]

It was the Jewish contribution to modernity that marked Jews as threats to national greatness, to the German *Volk*. Jews per se did not endanger Rembrandt-caliber, German authenticity; rather, it was Jews' status as agents

of modernity in culture and politics. Those who converted to Christianity and became assimilated were people Germans could "befriend" and "host" as welcome "guests". Germans were within their rights, however, to "show today's scheming literati the door."[29]

Of course, it is far from novel to point out that 19th-century anti-Semitism was more cultural-reactionary and anti-modern than it was confessional, as it had been in the Middle Ages. Worth unpacking, however, are the distinctions between such romantic reactionary ideology and the emerging *racial* anti-Semitism of the period, between Langbehn's Jewish "guests" and Goldzier's Jewish "parasites." Racial anti-Semitism would be able to co-opt the categories of modern scientific discourse—at the time associated with an ambiguous, scientific progressivism that offered competing notions of humanity and progress—towards an *absolute* exclusion of Jews, whether "noble" and pious, assimilated-aristocratic or modern and cosmopolitan.

II. Science and the Spirit

The German essence, to De Lagarde and Langbehn, was contrary to modernity and the scientific method, and was instead embodied in common German *Volkstum*. De Lagarde's and Langbehn's disdain for modern academic specialization and intellectualism, as Stern has noted, was tied up with a vitalistic "yearning for mystery and religion" that prized holistic philosophies explaining the laws of nature, ones that were "intuitive" and aesthetically grounded, over empiricism and methodical intellectual work.[30] Meanwhile, Ernst Haeckel presented the self-conscious combination of Darwinist materialism and esoteric vitalism of his Monistic philosophy as a "bridge connecting religion and science" that posited "one spirit in all things."[31] It offered a totalizing worldview that claimed to do everything Langbehn's detested science could not. Yet Monism did not provide an obvious next step from völkish anti-Semitism on an inexorable march to Nazism. Haeckel's devotion to enlightenment principles and self-conscious embrace of modernity meant his philosophy could not answer Langbehn's prayers.

The writings of Chamberlain, and of his legion followers that included such agitators as Otto Weininger and Hans Goldzier,[32] would eventually reconcile contradictions between science and romanticism in their scientific-racial anti-Semitism. Rather than examine their works, however, the present analysis investigates the cultural and intellectual milieu in which such racial anti-Semitic ideas, with their combined völkish and materialist content, could have currency. To understand this milieu, exclusive focus on anti-modern, völkish-romantic anti-Semites alone is insufficient. It is equally important to examine the ways popular scientific discourses in Germany variously integrated and shunned romantic thinking to create an intellectual environment where the direction and meaning of progress and modernity were uncertain, making possible the confluence of empiricist sensibilities and romantic-völkish ideas in racial anti-Semitism.

The ideologies in which Langbehn's and De Lagarde's anti-Semitic resentments festered had their pedigree in romantic ideas about distinct, naturally contiguous peoples, in whose realization human "character" was made possible.[33] National-Socialist-era German anti-Semitism is typically associated with social Darwinism. Yet the popularization of modern scientific discourse in German intellectual life that would eventually enable the social-Darwinist conceptual paradigm to take hold in Germany is widely attributed to the *aufklärerisch*—enlightened—liberal Ernst Haeckel. How did science, which in a simplified dichotomy of "conservative" and "progressive" stood athwart the forces of reaction as the standard-bearer of *aufklärerisch* modernity, factor into the modern ideological environment that gave rise to modern racial anti-Semitism? An investigation into Ernst Haeckel's Monistic philosophy and its perennially controversy-prone historiography provides some clues.

III. A Bridge Between Science and Religion

The zoologist Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) is widely credited with the popularization of Darwinism in Germany.[34] He also appropriated his scientific views into a Monistic religious philosophy that claimed to reconcile romantic and religious vitalism with scientific materialism:

> Our Monistic concept or "Philosophy of unity" is...clear and unambiguous; an "immaterial living spirit" is just as unthinkable for it as "dead spiritless material"; in every atom both are inextricably bound together.[35]

Haeckel's exegesis on his Monism, *Die Welträtsel,* (The Riddle of the Universe) posited an essential, unifying force in all matter and life, human and otherwise. One of the book's few passages that reflects at all on Jewishness exemplifies the anticlericalism of much of the work, and is characterized by both racial essentialism and the language of social-scientific detachment:

> The suggestion of the old apocryphal scriptures, that the Roman lieutenant Pandera or Pantheras was the true father of Christ, appears all the more credible when one critically evaluates the person of Christ via strict anthropological principles. Typically he is considered as a pure Jew. Yet the aspects of his character that especially indicate his high and noble persona, and which distinguish his "Religion of Love," are decidedly not Semitic; they appear much more as the essential qualities of the higher Aryan race and above all its noblest branch, the Greeks.[36]

Haeckel's attitude towards religious dogma evident here (and which characterizes much of the book) has led some scholars to situate Haeckel's universalizing, life-affirming and self-consciously materialist creed in the liberal ideological currents of his milieu,[37] while the implicitly anti-Semitic racial taxonomy appears to others, to varying degrees, as a kind of "proto-Nazism."[38] Such controversy has plagued the historiography of Ernst Haeckel's Monist League and its adherents for decades. Some argue that Haeckel and the Monist League espoused what we presently understand as ominous social Darwinism. In this view, the Monists' ideas were of a piece with the radical anti-clericalism of Houston Stewart Chamberlain and of De Lagarde.[39] Daniel Gasman made this argument in his book *The Scientific Origins of National Socialism,* contending that Haeckel's Monism constituted a "*prophetic* synthesis of romantically inclined Völkism with evolution and science." (Emphasis added) Gasman ascribed left-wing, presentist bias to scholars who read liberalism into Haeckel's scientific approach.[40] If this view is correct, the murky question of how Nazism arose proclaiming a philosophy both obscurantist

and scientific would appear resolved. In fact, Gasman's teleological view is an anti-historical, itself presentist, scholarly approach. Disproportionate attention to the ideas themselves and to their apparent similarities with later ideas, without regard to institutions, *mentalite* and other structural forces determining the reception and appropriation of such ideas, risks verging into over-determined analysis of the Monistic movement.

Writers presenting the contrary view to Gasman's are also capable of such folly when reducing German popularizers of Darwin such as Haeckel and Wilhelm Bölsche to decidedly anti-Romantic, left-leaning progressives, as opposed to Gasman's proto-Nazis.[41] Robert Richards has argued, sensibly, that quasi-religious naturalist arguments of racial hierarchy among European scientists date at least to the mid-eighteenth century.[42] Richards takes his defense of Haeckel's racial categories too far, however, disputing contentions of Haeckel's anti-Semitism with the reductive premise that "most rabid anti-Semites during Haeckel's time were conservative Christians." He even cites Haeckel's own claims of having many Jewish friends as evidence against his anti-Semitism.[43] Richards does not engage the subject of such anti-clerical and anti-Semitic radicals as De Lagarde or Langbehn, who made similar Jewish-friend claims. Neither of these writers, nor Stern's or any others' critiques of their "conservative revolutionary" ideas merits mention in Richards' entire 540-page monograph.

But Richards' critique points to an important truth: the fact that Haeckel thought in racial categories and developed a totalizing Darwinist philosophy is insufficient evidence that he was somehow responsible for making scientific-racial discourse accessible to völkish thinkers; rather, it is evidence that he was a nineteenth century European. Benjamin Disraeli led the government of the most powerful and far-flung empire in history, and race, as his biographer Cecil Roth observed, was his "obsession."[44] Surely someone with Disraeli's influence, imprimatur and popularity should have been able to exercise upon his constituency as much if not more influence than the zoologist Haeckel, in whose ideas Gasman located the "roots of National Socialism." Viewing Jews as a race was banal in this milieu, and could just as easily co-exist with vehement hatred towards Jews as with fondness for them. This is

apparent in Lord Redesdale's introduction to the English edition of Houston Stewart Chamberlain's magnum opus of modern anti-Semitic thought, *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century:*

> Race and blood are what constitute a type, and nowhere has this type been more carefully preserved than among the Jews...To the Ashkenazim, the so-called German Jews, Chamberlain is as it seems to me unjust...They are born financiers and the acquisition of money has been their characteristic talent. But of the treasure which they have laid up they have given freely....Who and what then is the Jew, this wonderful man who in the last hundred years has attained such a position in the civilized world?[45]

As Richard Weikart has remarked, the categories of "science" and "scholarship" were less distinct in the mid- to late-nineteenth century than they are now.[46] This fact allowed a variety of intellectual milieus to appropriate scientific categories into their analyses.

Attempts to pin down many of these intellectuals along a simple left-right spectrum are thus prone to anachronism. Haeckel himself began as a radical progressive and brought his scientific-materialist Monist views with him when he joined the National Liberal Party after 1866.[47] In this period, Social Darwinism came to be associated with the liberal, market-driven progress against which traditional conservatives struggled to uphold aristocratic and church power.[48] Yet Social Darwinism would also become integrated into imperial conquests in Africa—policies associated with monarchists and liberals alike.[49] In the case of the progressive feminist and supporter of eugenics Gertrud Bäumer, science and humanity could easily co-exist with ideas that today appear portentous. For her, the liberal and humanistic ideals of Herder that industrial capitalism and Whiggish ideology had trampled upon could be rescued by the vigorous political application of scientific racial politics, via the budding "science" of eugenics.[50]

While Haeckel's monistic philosophy may have *prefigured* National Socialist ideas by providing language and categories for the latter's appropriation, the

former, taken on its own terms, represented a universalizing view of humanity and nature fundamentally incompatible with the anti-Semitic antagonism of Chamberlain and his followers. Haeckel, though no philosemite, supported assimilation for Jews,[51] necessarily putting him at odds with the hateful determinism of scientific racists. At the same time, he was a part of a different progressive milieu than ours; not clearly "left" or "right," and one frequently at peace with ideological trends and practices now widely viewed as abhorrent. Such a cautious, historicized approach to Haeckel is a more responsible way to ground claims about the relationship of empiricism, Romanticism and racism in the Wilhelmine milieu.

This ambiguous progressivism appears in Haeckel's frank words outside his own published works. Race, in terms of the Jewish question in Germany, was no trump card, as with Haeckel's romantic-völkish counterparts discussed above. He contended that anti-Semitism, like "every movement, can be both beneficial and dangerous." Haeckel considered it "a benefit of anti-Semitism, that it is awakening in Germans and Jews the conviction that Jews must give up their particularity *(Sonderart)* to become perfect Germans..."[52] Haeckel appears in this interview genuinely fond of integrated German Jews and their contributions to modernity and progress, merely sharing with the latter their fabled distaste for Eastern European-Jewish immigrants—not because they were Jews, but because they "awaken[ed] only mistrust, unlike [modern German Jews], and hinder[ed] [the Jews'] complete absorption into our nation."[53] Haeckel advocated here a qualified sense of humanity, one that gave heed to cultural differences and the rights of societies to refuse foreign elements, be it California's limits on Chinese immigration or English aversion to Russian immigrants. This is in the same passage where he emphasized that he considered "refined and genteel Jews important factors of German culture, [that] this should not be forgotten about them...they have always bravely stood for enlightenment and freedom against the forces of reaction."[54] With regard to the Jews, he did think in terms of race, though it would be imprecise to call him a "racist" towards them, as he believed the "Semitic" and "Aryan" races both to be among the "highest."[55] The question of whether Haeckel was a proto-Nazi, a conservative or a left-progressive is therefore the wrong one. Haeckel's monistic attempt to reconcile science and *Geist* with modernity occurred within

a web of contested meanings that, over a century later, appear deeply contingent on their historical context.

As is now famously the case with Nietzsche, it is crucial to avoid teleological reduction of ideas like Haeckel's to how they were perceived by some people after his death, especially while ignoring such ideas' appropriation and propagation by many others, such as the decidedly anti-Fascist, socialist leadership of the Monist League from 1919–1933.[56] The vitalist-scientist tenor of Monistic thought indeed echoes that found in other, more unambiguously reactionary thinkers in the fin-de-siècle. This does not necessitate a causal connection between Haeckel's pseudo-scientific mysticism and blatantly racist, violently anti-Semitic thinkers such as Otto Weininger and Guido von List. But the extent to which Haeckel's categories and language—his "science of the soul," even if he did not intend it this way—were able to catch on in his milieu suggest an environment where both scientific and mystical language could not only compete but coexist, with their respective adherents borrowing from one another's repertoire.

Charges of proto-Nazism, on the one hand, and defensive ascriptions of left-progressivism, on the other, are therefore misleading, when talking about turn-of-the-20th-century German thinkers who walked the line between romantic-naturalist ideology and scientific progress. I have shown that a heightened appreciation for the contested meanings of "progressive," "liberal," and "reform" as German thinkers understood them at the turn of the 20th century is a useful lens to understanding the apparent cacophony of this period. Scrutiny of some of the "progressive" writers of this period who advocated various forms of race theory as means for the betterment of humankind reveals that more than romantic rejection of modernity was at work. As the line between the romantic and the modern became increasingly blurred, ambiguously backward- and forward-looking—rather than merely materialist or reactionary—responses to the perceived ills of modernity emerged.

END NOTES

1   Th. Newest (Hans Goldzier), *Einige Weltprobleme, 6. Teil: Vom Zweck zum Ursprung des organischen Lebens* (Vienna, 1908), 138. Quoted in Brigitte Hamann, *Hitlers Wien: Lehrjahre Eines Diktators* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1996), 320.

2   Ibid., 321.

3   Ibid., 318.

4   See Kevin Repp, "'More Corporeal, More Concrete': Liberal Humanism, Eugenics, and German Progressives at the Last Fin-de-Siecle," in *The Journal of Modern History,* 72nd Ser. 3 (2000); Richard Weickart, "Progress through Racial Extermination: Social Darwinism, Eugenics, and Pacifism in Germany, 1860-1918," in *German Studies Review* 2nd Ser. 26 (May, 2003), passim.

5   Ernst Haeckel, *Der Monismus als Band zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft: Glaubensbekenntnis eines Naturforschers* (Bonn: Emil Strauss, 1892), 8.

6   Repp, "'More Corporeal, More Concrete,'" 686, 717–8, passim.

7   Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), xiv, xxiii.

8   Alfred Kelly, *The Descent of Darwin: The Popularization of Darwinism* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1981), 10–11.

9   Paul De Lagarde, "Die Handschriftensammlung des Grafen von Ashburnham," in *Mittheilungen v. I* (Goettingen: Dieterichsche Sortimentsbuchhandlung, 1884), 2.

10 Paul De Lagarde,, "Lipman Zunz und Seine Verehrer," in *Mittheilungen v. II* (Goettingen: Dieterichsche Sortimentsbuchhandlung, 1884), Google Books, 162. (All translations are mine unless otherwise noted) In the 19th century and today, the word *Rasse* is used almost exclusively to mean "breed"—i.e. exclusively for non-human animals. Modern German writing on the matter has recently taken to using the Anglicism Race when talking about it in the modern, socially-constructed sense, since *ein Volk* can just as easily translate to "a people, " however often it was once used interchangeably with *Rasse*.

11 Ibid., 159. "The Jewish question is certainly a race question, but no properly idealistic person can deny that even race can be overcome by the spirit." As his detractor, the Viennese Rabbi Moses Güdemann, pointed out in a letter De Lagarde himself printed later in the *Mittheilungen,* De Lagarde appeared, between this and the previous quote, to shift on the question of whether "race" is an appropriate category for human affairs. Güdemann went on to suggest that DeLagarde's claim that he could accept a Jew as his brother "under certain circumstances" rang false, since Jews' very distinction of

themselves as Jews, regardless of how many generations they'd lived in Germany, was for De Lagarde incompatible with Germanness itself. ("Juden und Indogermanen," *Mittheilungen v. II,* 266.)

12 Ibid. "I had many Jewish schoolmates, and many of them have since become friends of mine; I have also welcomed with open arms Jews of the sort most foreign to Germany, and promoted them where possible; I have previously defended Jewry against the Jew Zunz...."

13 De Lagarde, "Juden und Indogermanen," 334.

14 Ibid., 346.

15 This word has a double meaning in this context, appearing in a passage where De Lagarde rails against Jewish financiers. The gerund *Wuchernd* means "rampant" or "proliferating," but the noun *Wucher* means "usurer."

16 De Lagarde, "Juden und Indogermanen," 339.

17 Stanley Zucker, "Ludwig Bamberger and the Rise of Anti-Semitism in Germany, 1848–1893," *Central European History,* 3d Ser. 4 (1970), 333.

18 For example, "Fortschritt innerhalb der Menschheit, so stellt sich jedes Kind, gegenüber seinem Elternpaar, als eine »edlere Minderheit« dar; innerhalb *eines Volkes, einer Rasse, aller Rassen* ist es ebenso." —(emphasis added) Julius Langbehn, *Rembrandt als Erzieher,* Projekt Gutenberg-DE. Kindle Edition, 26–28.

19 For example, "Nicht der Geist der ruhigen bürgerlichen Liebe der Verfassung und der Gesetze, sondern die verzehrende Flamme der höheren Vaterlandsliebe, die die Nation als Hülle des Ewigen umfaßt, für welche der Edle mit Freuden sich opfert, und der Unedle, der nur um des ersten willen da ist, sich eben opfern soll." Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Reden and die Deutsche Nation* (Projekt Gutenberg-DE. Kindle Edition), Kindle Locations 1851–1853.

20 Julius Langbehn, *Rembrandt als Erzieher* (German Edition) (pp. 26–28). Projekt Gutenberg-DE. Kindle Edition, 2011.

21 Ibid., 11–12.

22 Houston Stewart Chamberlain, *Die Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1899), passim.

23 See for example Langbehn, *Rembrandt als Erzieher,* 8–9: "Just as one detects the wind's direction in the position of a blade of grass, so do the spiritual (*geistige*) winds of change—such as those in Germany today—show themselves, among other things, in the fact that the "professor" character is disappearing from pedestrian German plays and novels to make way for the "artist" character. Even triviality has its laws, and they run parallel—harmoniously enough—to those of ingenuity. In this case both proclaim

only good things; they promise redemption from this superficial age; they proclaim a return to colorfulness and vitality, to unity and purity, to intimacy and inwardness.."

24 Langbehn, *Rembrandt als Erzieher,* 357: "It is a long way from Abraham, Job, Isaiah, and the Psalmists, to today's stockbrokers; it is as long as the way from the noble to the common, and one should never forget this difference."

25 Earl of Beaconsfield was the title Disraeli received from Queen Victoria in 1876.

26 Ibid., 356.

27 Langbehn, Ibid., 358.

28 Ibid., 359.

29 Ibid.

30 Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair,* xiv; 124–125.

31 Haeckel, *Der Monismus als Band zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft,* 8.

32 Hamann, *Hitlers Wien,* 319–322; 325–328. Otto Weininger's anti-Semitic work *Geschlecht und Charakter* presented a "scientific" taxonomy of predominantly "masculine" (e.g. Germanic) and "feminine" (e.g. Semitic) races; Hanz Goldzier prolifically self-published polemical pamphlets espousing unconventionally "scientific" theories about race, geology and astronomy. As Hamann argues, National Socialist ideology was heavily indebted to both authors. I have left explicit study of their works out of the present paper in order to focus on the abovementioned, harder-to-classify discursive "cacophony" in which they emerged.

33 Langbehn, *Rembrandt als Erzieher,* 10. "'To have character and be German are without question the same thing,' says Fichte. The German must be brought back to this innate yet long-lost characteristic."

34 Alfred Kelly, *The Descent of Darwin* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1981), 5–6. Kelly himself argues, against the conventional wisdom, that Haeckel's colleague Wilhelm Bölsche was the more important figure in the popularization of Darwinism in Germany.

35 Haeckel, *Der Monismus als Band zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft,* 26.

36 Ernst Haeckel, *Die Welträtsel - Kommentierte Gold Collection* (Jazzybee Publishing: Kindle Edition, 2010) (Original: Leipzig: Alfred Kröner, 1899), Kindle Locations 5670–5671.

37 See for example Alfred Kelly, *The Descent of Darwin* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1981); and more recently, Sander Gliboff, *H.G. Bronn, Ernst Haeckel, and the origins of German Darwinism: a study in translation and transformation* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008); Robert Richard, *The tragic sense of life: Ernst Haeckel and the struggle over evolutionary thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008)

38 See for example Daniel Gasman, *The Scientific Origins of National Socialism* (New

York: American Elsevier, 1971); Richard Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany* (New York: Macmillan, 2004). Gasman uses the term "proto-Nazi" frequently throughout his book. Weikart is actually critical of Gasman's Haeckel-to-Hitler teleology, but holds Darwinism's introduction into German ideological currents responsible for the rise of National Socialism.

39 Daniel Gasman, *The Scientific Origins of National Socialism* (New York: American Elsevier, 1971), 63–64.

40 Gasman, ibid., 60 & 71.

41 Kelly, *The Descent of Darwin,* 120–121. See also Robert Richards, *The Tragic Sense of Life: Ernst Haeckel and the Struggle over Evolutionary Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008),

42 Robert Richards, *The Tragic Sense of Life: Ernst Haeckel and the Struggle over Evolutionary Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 271.

43 Ibid, 273–274.

44 Cecil Roth, *Benjamin Disraeli: Earl of Beaconsfeld* (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1952), 70.

45 Lord Redesdale, Introduction to Houston Stewart Chamberlain, *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century,* trans. John Lees (London: John Lane, 1911), xxxiv.

46 Richard Weikart, "The Origins of Social Darwinism in Germany, 1859–1895," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* 54th Ser. 3 (1993): 472.

47 Ibid., 473

48 Ibid.

49 Elizabeth Hull, *Absolute destruction: Military culture and the practices of war in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 105 & 331–332.

50 Repp, Ibid., 686, 717, passim.

51 Michael Biddiss, "Racial Ideas and the Politics of Prejudice, 1850–1914," in *The Historical Journal* 3rd Ser., 15 (September, 1972), 577.

52 Hermann Bahr, *Der Antisemitismus: ein internationales Interview* (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1894), 68.

53 Ibid, 68–69.

54 Ibid.

55 Richards, *The Tragic Sense of Life,* 245–246.

56 Daniel Gasman, introduction to Transaction Edition, lii-liii, *The Scientific Origins of National Socialism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004) Original: Macdonald and American Elsevier, 1971.

Space Sovereignty and the Outer Space Treaty

Yoni Benovitz ('19)

In 1967, in Moscow and Washington, the world's major powers signed the Outer Space Treaty, which established the rules and law for humanity's new endeavors into space. Since then the Outer Space Treaty (and various other treaties and agreements designed to clarify it) have served as the legal basis for space law. The main purpose of the Outer Space Treaty when it was designed and signed in the 1960s was to prevent the United States and the Soviet Union from expanding the Cold War into space, and to prevent space from being abused by nations competing for prestige of resources. The principle that the Outer Space Treaty established, the idea that space shouldn't be touched outside of scientific experiments, served the world well during the Cold War, and successfully prevented space from becoming a potential spark in the Cold War. However, in the 21st century the Outer Space Treaty's original purpose as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the United States is no longer applicable. Furthermore, many of the Outer Space Treaty's original anti-war goals have become an impediment to the advancement of commercial activities in space, which is the future of the development of space technology. The Outer Space Treaty needs to be replaced with the agreements we need to open space up to the free market.

The basic premise of the Outer Space Treaty is the idea that space should be considered a common heritage of mankind, which means it is not owned by any country and cannot be owned, similar to Antarctica and the high seas.

Article I of the Outer Space treaty (OST) states very clearly that that Outer Space is "the province of all mankind,"[1] and that "exploration and use of Outer Space ... shall be carried out for the interests of all mankind,"[2] i.e. space is owned by everyone and all activities in space must be done in a way that provides a clear benefit to all mankind. In Article II, the OST also bans any claims of sovereignty in Outer Space,[3] unlike the Antarctic treaty, which established Antarctica as a place common to mankind, yet also allowed nations that had claimed sovereignty to retain their claims. Finally, the other important part of the OST is Article VI, which states that "the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including ... celestial bodies, shall require ... supervision by the appropriate State."[4] These rules, together, block the future of space exploration.

Commercialization is the future for technological development in space. Since the end of the Cold War and the space race, interest in space in America and Russia, the world's two largest space-faring nations, has all but disappeared. According to a poll by the General Social Survey, American interest in Space has only gotten higher than 50% once: when Neil Armstrong walked on the moon. Since then interest has never gotten above 50%.[5] Furthermore, since the Space Race, when NASA's budget peaked at about 4.5% of the federal budget, NASA's budget has been falling, until where it is today, below 0.5%.[6] This lack of public interest and funding has led to NASA cancelling many of its revolutionary ideas and projects over the past 40 years, and today the United States doesn't even have the capabilities to send astronauts into space, nor do they have a clear vision of their role in the future, aside from a vague vision of sending something to Mars at some unknown point in time. Because of the lack of interest in the public sector, many private companies have moved to take up the slack that NASA and other space agencies have been forced to leave behind. These private companies represent the future for advancement in technology and exploration in Outer Space. There are many economic incentives for companies to explore space, such as the ability to mine the moon and asteroids, which can be a trillion-dollar industry,[7] and building space colonies which can be used for further exploration, research centers, and eventually, in the *very* far away future, a space tourism industry. However, the Outer Space Treaty blocks many possible avenues for space commercialization, and

because of this possible negative effect on companies who are the future of space exploration, the OST is no longer a viable basis for space law.

In order for private companies to become feasible they must be allowed to commercialize space, particularly through space mining, because of its many obvious benefits. The OST, however, states in Article I that "uses of Outer Space, including ... celestial bodies, shall be carried out in the interests of all countries."[8] Many argue[9] that this clause prohibits private companies, or nations, from mining celestial bodies, such as the moon or asteroids, because, for example, a company that mines iron from the surface of the moon and then sells that iron does not clearly provide any benefit to citizens of any country other than the members of the company that mined that iron. Furthermore, commercial activities could have a negative effect, by accidently destroying or polluting potential scientific discoveries, or any part of space in general, which could also violate Article IX, which says that "[exploration shall be conducted] so as to prevent the harmful contamination [of celestial bodies]." Another area where the OST potentially conflicts with attempts to mine space is Articles III and VI. Article III bans countries from attempting to claim national sovereignty over any celestial body and Article VI requires countries to authorize and regulate all non-governmental entities that send anything into space. These two rules together can block private entities from claiming ownership, not sovereignty, over pieces of land on celestial bodies. For example, if a government attempts to give over property rights of an asteroid to a certain private individual, or company, as Article VI requires, isn't that automatically a claim of sovereignty by said government over the asteroid, because otherwise by what right does any government have to give ownership rights to a non-government entity?

The Outer Space Treaty also creates problem with the management of large scale colonization programs that many agree is one of the biggest long term goals of private companies and the rest of humanity's endeavors in space. Colonies would face many of the same legal issues under the OST that mining missions would. Namely, how they can be prevented from ever harmfully contaminating a celestial body, and how governments could authorize allotment of land on celestial bodies without claiming de facto sovereignty. Another

issue is that since space, under the OST, would have a legal status similar to the high seas, where national jurisdiction only applies on ships that are flying their nation's flag, a government will only have jurisdiction over the parts of the colony that were produced and sent into space from its borders.[10] Presumably the nation would also have jurisdiction over anything that was produced in a space colony, although this isn't clearly explained in the Outer Space Treaty. However, if a nation can only apply its laws and jurisdiction over the structures that make up a space colony and not the land on which it is built, many problems arise. For example, if a company wants to build a private research base on the moon, they won't be able to stop some other company from setting up their own colony right next to this private base and doing whatever they want around it, which disincentivizes investment in space. Furthermore, if one company found some sort of discovery on a celestial body and wanted exclusive rights to explore and develop it, the OST's clause that says all Outer Space should be open to free exploration would prevent any company from bothering to spend the money needed to develop said discovery. The excessive amount of red tape as well as the lack of clear parameters for managing space work deters private companies from investing in space and creating the future of humanity.

Despite its many shortcomings, the OST is not entirely bad. Many of the rules in it that block commercialization in space provide protections for possible scientific discoveries, as well as for the natural beauty of space, and the vast majority of nations who are not capable of launching anything into space. With its strict rules on what can be allowed into space, the OST protects celestial bodies from being contaminated by humans. Without the OST's rules many possible discoveries could be lost. For example, many scientists believe that it is theoretically possible that life could exist or may have existed on Mars; if that is in fact accurate, the potential scientific discoveries are huge. If private companies were to begin sending large amounts of astronauts to Mars, if just one ship exploded and sent biological material from Earth across Mars it could destroy any simple life form on Mars, destroying a scientific breakthrough. The OST also protects private companies from exploring Outer Space, finding and then claiming whatever they want to and preventing the rest of humanity from sharing in their discoveries. Finally, the OST protects

most countries, which don't have space travel capabilities, because if private companies could start traveling to space and claiming whatever they want today, most of the Solar System would be owned primarily by companies in America, Russia, some in Europe, and some in China, leaving all other nations behind.

The benefits the OST can provide are by far outweighed by the huge gains that will be made in space exploration by opening space up to private companies. However, just getting rid of the OST without replacing it will only result in different problems in the areas that the OST currently protects. Therefore, in order to create a new international regime that takes into account the need for private investment in space as well as the need to protect space from the problems that these investors could potentially cause, the Outer Space Treaty must either be revised or replaced. For the new international treaty that would take the OST's place to create a free market while protecting space, there is a need for a system operating on a more case-by-case basis, under some sort of international regulatory body. An international organization that regulates anyone who wants to claim a piece of space would be better than individual countries each creating their own regulations because an international body would ensure that space doesn't become a mess of competing claims by different nations, and would protect the interests of nations which aren't yet space-faring. This organization could also regulate the authorization of land claims by private companies and nations and would be able to enforce parts of the OST that certainly should be kept, like the ban on WMDs and military operations in space, in addition to the liability convention, which holds nations responsible for whatever they send into space, something the OST always lacked. Ultimately we need private investors to continue to explore Space, but since the Outer Space Treaty was not written with space mining or colonization in mind, and was not designed to create a well-regulated industry in Space, a replacement or revision must be sought.

END NOTES

1   "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," October 10, 1967, *UNTS* 610, no. 8843, pt. 1 (1967).

2   Ibid.

3   Ibid., pt. 2.

4   Ibid., pt. 7.

5   Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Robert Pear, "Americans' Complicated Relationship With Space Travel," *Washington Post,* July 15, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/07/15/americans-complicated-relationship-with-space-travel/?utm_term=.be88c134402b.

6   The Guardian Data Blog, "Nasa Budgets: US Spending on Space Since 1958," *The Guardian,* Febuary 1, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/feb/01/nasa-budgets-us-spending-space-travel.

7   Desjardins, Jeff, "The Value of Asteroid Mining," *Business Insider,* November 3, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-value-of-asteroid-mining-2016-11.

8   Treaty on Principles, October 10, 1967, *UNTS* 610, no. 8843, pt. 1 (1967).

9   Tronchetti, Fabio "The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: A Move Forward or a Step Back?" *Space Review,* 33 (2015): 7.

10 Fecht, Sara, "Do Earth Laws Apply To Mars Colonists?" *Popular Science,* September 27, 2016, http://www.popsci.com/who-would-rule-colony-on-mars.

The Evolution of Chess

Noam Putterman ('18)

Introduction

The game of chess is widely considered the most respectable and intellectual game in the world—a war fought without weapons and resulting in no bloodshed. Chess is simply an intellectual struggle in which one tries to intricately maneuver and formulate complex plans to outfox and defeat his or her opponent. This article will mainly focus on the more modern Chess era and its development, from the 19th century to the present. A brief history of its origins is presented to show justice to the legendary game.

Chess has been played for several centuries, with its origins dating back to the 6th century CE. The game probably originated in India, and then spread to Persia.[1] When the 7th century Arab conquests conquered Persia, the game spread into North Africa and subsequently Europe. From there, chess spread to the Middle East and into Russia. Chess as we know it today was most likely developed in Europe, where it became an incredibly popular game. Pamphlets were written teaching chess to beginners, and more complicated essays and even full books attempted to teach strategy, develop openings,[2] and analyze endgames.[3] One of the most influential works to popularize chess was *Libro de la invención liberal y arte del juego del axedrez* (Book of the Liberal Invention and Art of the Game of Chess), written in 1561 by Spanish priest Ruy Lopez de Segura. This book was the first to analyze the famed Ruy Lopez opening,

which is still extensively analyzed today. Chess was particularly prevalent in coffeehouses, where people would come to drink and play a quick game. It is from these origins that chess developed into what it is today.

As is often the case with constantly developing ideas, chess progressed throughout history with various schools of thought. Each school had a slightly different philosophy regarding the ideal approach to chess strategy, and this philosophy was manifested on the chessboard itself.

Schools of Chess: The Romantic School

The first school of chess was the Romantic School. Similar to the Romantic Era of the arts in both chronology and ideology, the Romantic School was characterized by fiery, sacrificial chess play. Romantic players often sacrificed many of their pieces in hopes of checkmating the enemy king. The Romantic chess players believed that Chess was first and foremost an art; it was a manifestation of beauty. They aimed to create games that were aesthetically pleasing. The amount of material[4] on the board made no difference. Romantics like Adolf Anderssen and Lionel Kieseritzky would sacrifice piece after piece, all along trapping the enemy king in a "net" of enemy pieces, with checkmate to follow. The Romantics played what is called "tactical chess." This style of play is characterized by immediate threats and complex, scintillating attacks. Romantic players often played gambits[5], which matched their style of play. Notice the similarity between the Romantic art movement, which occurred during roughly the same time period. Romantic Art was meant to inspire feeling and emotion in the viewer. The Romantic Chess School would also attempt to create art—on the chessboard, by virtue of a swashbuckling, bold, daring style of play. This is parallel to the Romantic notion of painting masterpieces meant to inspire awe and unequivocal beauty.[6]

The Classical School

This Romantic style of adventurous chess would continue until the 1880s. The

Romantic style was effectively invalidated by the first World Chess Champion, Wilhelm Steinitz. Steinitz, a Romantic himself, discovered that the daring attacks of the Romantic School could be easily refuted with proper defense. He created his own style, based not on premature and bombastic attacks of the enemy king, but of strategic maneuvering of the chess pieces. Steinitz is credited with discovering "positional chess," the opposite of tactical chess. This style was a slower, more strategic way to play the game. Steinitz's play was based on accumulating small advantages throughout the game, using those advantages to create a superior position, and converting the position to victory. Some of these advantages included control of the center,[7] using the bishop pair[8] and pawn structure.[9] This style became known as the Classical School. Steinitz did not reject completely the prior Romantic notions; he simply advocated a firm stronghold in the center of the board before launching a direct attack on the enemy king. Using his newly-formed strategies, Steinitz defeated one of the world's best players, Johannes Zukertort, in the first World Championship match. Steinitz's Positional chess prevailed for the next 40 years or so. It was built on by the next World Champions Emanuel Lasker, Jose Raul Capablanca, and Alexander Alekhine.

The Hypermodern School

The next school of chess emerged following World War One: the Hypermodern School. Hypermodernism challenged the system set up by Steinitz and his contemporaries. Instead of controlling the center of the board directly, the Hypermoderns advocated controlling the center of the board from the flanks. Minor pieces[10] were to control the center of the board from a distance, thus inviting the opponent to occupy the center with Classical Steinitz approaches. The Hypermoderns thought that this center could be attacked from the flanks. Notable practitioners of Hypermodernism included Danish chess master Aron Nimzowitsch and Austro-Hungarian master Richard Reti.

These schools of chess remained the primary philosophies regarding the proper way to play the game. Even the refuted Romantic style experienced a resurgence under the eighth World Champion, Mikhail Tal. Tal would often

play complex, tactical positions, launching devastating attacks against the opponent's king. Other World Champions would blend the Classical Steinitzian School and Hypermodernism into a solid, positional, and strategic style of play. One such player was World Champion Mikhail Botvinnik. Botvinnik sought to slowly accumulate positional advantages (the Bishop Pair, better pawn structure, etc.) and grind his opponent into an endgame, where his superior position would lead him to victory. Other World Champions adopted a blend of all three schools of chess. Garry Kasparov, the youngest World Champion of all time, was one such player. In calm positions, he strategically maneuvered his pieces to powerful squares,[11] awaiting the opportunity for an attack. When this opportunity arose, Kasparov transformed into one of the greatest tacticians[12] of all time.[13] Due to his ability to play all types of positions, Kasparov is widely considered the greatest player of all time.

The Impact of Computers on Chess

However, the three aforementioned schools now have a serious competitor: the computer. Since the 1970s, chess engines have greatly influenced modern chess play. These computers have the ability to predict and evaluate many potential future moves and thus determine the best move in their specific position. Grandmasters[14] began using these computers to analyze their games and prepare openings. There became a discrepancy between a "human move" and a "computer move," and modern play began to focus on always playing the "computer move." Computers in chess became a serious addition to any chess player's game after IBM's Deep Blue chess computer defeated the reigning World Champion, Kasparov, in a six-game match. At the time, Kasparov was rated 2820 ELO,[15] the highest in the world. Computers have continued to become stronger with time. Nowadays, computers can easily defeat the world's best Grandmasters: the highest rated computer is named Stockfish, and is rated at 3386 ELO, while the highest rated player is currently at 2839 ELO. Due to the computer-dominance of the chess world, chess has primarily become a game of humans trying to imitate the machine. In preparation for prestigious tournaments, Grandmasters use these computers to memorize thousands of moves and variations of chess openings. The computer is viewed as infallible,

as its rating is far out of the league of modern Grandmasters.

In my opinion, the new era of chess ushered in by advanced computers is hurting chess more than advancing it. Sure, Grandmasters now play more accurate moves, to a certain degree, but the beauty of chess is lost. Instead of chess being a creative struggle, it now has memorization as its main priority, and creativity is only considered secondarily. Nowadays, the top Grandmasters don't attempt vicious attacks and stunning combinations,[16] but rather rely on "boring" chess, attempting to find the "computer move." The computer is a crutch that all of the top-ranked chess players lean on to survive, and it deprives the game of its beauty.

As it turns out, former World Champion Robert James "Bobby" Fischer thought similarly. He wanted to remove computer-influenced opening preparation, and play chess based on true skill and talent.[17] Thus, he created a chess variant[18] called Chess960, or Fischer Random Chess. The setup of Chess960 is similar to normal chess, where each side has 8 pawns on the second row, but the pieces on the first rank are in a random position.[19] Fischer had hoped that the 960 random positions possible in his new variant would extricate modern chess from the computer era and into a new, revived era of sheer talent, wit, and skill. Thus, to solve the issue of computer dominance of the chess world, Chess 960 may need to become the new "normal" way to play chess.

Conclusion

Chess is a beautiful game. It has evolved through the centuries from a daring, attacking game to a slow, positional one. Influenced by the Romantic, Classical, and Hypermodern schools, chess theory has evolved into the skillful mindgame it is today. However, the "Silicon Beast" has emerged, establishing total dominance over the chess world. Therefore, variants of chess are required to restore the balance and properly demonstrate who can play this centuries-old game with true genius and effortless finesse.

END NOTES

1   David Shenk, *The Immortal Game: a History of Chess,* New York: Knopf Doubleday
    Publishing Group, 2006.

2   The opening is the first main stage of a chess game, where each side mobilizes their
    forces in preparation of the oncoming battle.

3   An endgame is a simplified chess position where most of the pieces have been
    exchanged, and players attempt to promote the remaining pawns to queens.

4   "Material" is a chess phrase referring to the relative value of a chess piece. For
    example, if White has 2 pawns and a knight, while Black has 3 pawns and a knight,
    chess players would say that Black is "up" in material.

5   A gambit is a pawn sacrifice in the opening to mobilize the pieces towards a quick
    attack on the enemy king.

6   For those interested, arguably the most famous game of chess was played in this
    Romantic style. Called the "Immortal Game," White sacrificed two rooks and a queen
    to deliver checkmate.

7   The center is important in chess because a strongly-supported center allows one's
    pieces further range to influence the game. It can be compared to fighting a war on the
    high-ground.

8   When one side has both the light and dark-squared bishop, he effectively controls all
    64 squares on the chessboard, whereas the other side's single bishop can only
    influence one color, or 32 squares. A player will try to trade his knight(s) for his
    opponent's bishop(s) to attain this advantage.

9   Pawns support each other. A pawn that cannot be defended by other pawns is weak,
    tying down the other pieces to its defense. Such a pawn is susceptible to attack by the
    enemy.

10 This is chess parlance for knights and bishops.

11 Every position has certain squares that must be controlled to aid in winning the game.
    Control of this type of square is essential as it allows the player increased influence on
    the chessboard. For example, a knight cemented in the middle of the board influences
    8 squares (as opposed to a knight on the edge, which only controls 4). A player must
    properly assess the position and decide which squares are essential to proceed his
    operations against the enemy king.

12 A tactician is one who excels at tactical chess.

13 Some claim that this dynamic style of play is called the Soviet Chess School.

14 The highest title awarded to a chess player.

15   The ELO system was invented by Hungarian American chess master Arpad Elo. This system attempts to calculate the skills of a player relative to his contemporaries.

16   A combination is a series of moves leading to material gain (see footnote 4 for a definition of material) or checkmate.

17   Fischer, the top American player, was set to face Soviet Boris Spassky in a World Championship match in 1972, at the height of the Cold War. Chess was not as popular in America as in Russia, so Fischer was virtually alone against the "Russian Chess Machine," a team of Grandmasters and computers aiding Spassky. This explains Fischer's desire for a new type of chess. Fischer defeated Spassky convincingly and retired from the public eye.

18   A chess variant is a game based on and similar to chess. It might have an 8x9 board, or a queen that can move like a knight.

19   Each side still has two rooks, bishops, and knights, as well as one queen and king.

The Khazar Empire and Ashkenazic Jewry

Moshe Hecht ('18)

Introduction

A major question always seems to be asked about Ashkenazi Jewry that usually lacks a definitive answer. Why do the features of the average Ashkenazi not resemble the features of his/her ancient Israelites ancestors? For example, the Sephardic group of Jews closely resemble their ancient ancestors, while Ashkenazi Jews do not have Middle Eastern features and resemble more of the fair skinned features of the people of Eastern Europe.

Many scholars suggest a simple answer to this issue. Scholars identify that with the rising persecution of Jews in Western Europe and the Byzantine Empire, Jews began to flee to the northern countries in Eastern Europe. The Jews then integrated with the native culture and intermarried with the inhabitants. By intermarrying with the native society the Jews managed to retain the features of the inhabitants and thus develop their features. Although this theory is held by many historians, there seems to be a theory that suggests the creation of Ashkenazi Jewry came about via an entirely different reason. According to this alternative theory, which is not held by most historians but cannot be definitively discredited, Ashkenazi Jewry is descended not from the Ancient Israelites but rather from a group of Jewish converts from the unfamiliar Khazar Empire.

The Khazar Empire

The Khazar Empire was a vast regional power which at its height stretched from the Caucasus Mountains all the way into the borders of modern day Ukraine. The Khazar Empire stood as a buffering zone between the aging Byzantine Empire and the growing power of the Arab Caliphate. It was the Khazar persistence against the Arab invaders that eventually halted their assault into Western Europe. A fascinating aspect of the Khazarian Empire is the conversion of the entire upper-class society to Judaism. It is a fascinating discussion as to the motive for their conversion; whether it be a theological or political reason, it seems they converted to Judaism and made their empire much more diverse.

The Khazars were predominantly from a Turkish background and most likely originated from Central Asia or the Caucasus mountains. The Khazar were also both racially and ethnically mixed. There were three ethnicities in the early Khazar History. There were black-haired people with brown eyes, red-haired people with blue eyes, and fair-haired people.[1] Tong Yabghu's son formed an independent Khazar kingdom when he took possession of the fortress city of Derbent.[2]

The capital of the Khazar Empire was the joint city of Atil and Khazarian. It was a multi-ethnic city with residents spanning from Muslims, Jews, and Christians. Khazaria was filled with mostly Muslim merchants while the king and his nobleman mainly populated Atil.

Just as in ancient Sparta, the government was orchestrated as a dual kingship: there were two main important figures that ruled over the empire, known as the Bek and the Kagan. The emperor known as the Kagan was a sacred religious leader who lived in seclusion from the public. The Kaganship was hereditary and after the initial conversion to Judaism, the Kagan was only allowed to be a Jew. In the middle of the ninth century, the Kagan's power began to diminish and the ruler called the Bek started to seize more control.

The Bek's main responsibility was being in charge of military operations of the

Khazar Empire. As the Kagan power diminished to a spiritual figurehead the Bek began taking over all of the secular affairs of the Kaganate.[3] Besides for the Bek and the Kagan, the local governors called the Tudons collected taxes for the well-being of the emperor.[4]

The Khazars also had a very organized judicial system with the "supreme court" being located in Atil. The Supreme Court had seven judges. There were two Jewish judges, two Muslim judges, two Christian judges, and one pagan judge. In this sense, anyone who was being judged would have a fair chance that the judges would not all be biased against them. The Jewish judges would commonly examine the Torah and would see how it applied in daily life.[5]

The Khazars were known as a nomadic culture usually living in tents or small clay houses. Their main staple diet was of fish. They had a unique style of dress, wearing long fur coats similar to what Ashkenazi Jews wore in the nineteenth century.[6] Trade in Khazaria was essential and Khazaria became known as a great medieval trading center. They traded everything, from Chinese paper to pottery from the Middle East. The most notable traders in the Khazar Empire were the Jewish Radhanites merchants.[7] The Jewish merchants traded silk and furs from Europe and spices from Asia to the Khazars. Thus these merchants influenced some of the cultures in Khazar society, eventually leading up the Khazars' conversion to Judaism.

Khazar Conversion and Its Relationship with Ashkenazi Jewry

At the start of the eighth century, the two main world superpowers were the Byzantine Empire and the Arab caliphate. Both of these powers tried to convert the Khazars to their religious faiths. In the eyes of the Khazars, they saw that to convert to either Christianity or Islam from a political perspective would mean that they would be subordinate to the caliph or the byzantine emperor and wanted to maintain their independence as its own reigning power.[8] The Khazars also realized that they could no longer maintain their shamanistic religion, as their stronger neighbors saw it as barbaric.[9] As Jewish refugees fled to Khazaria from the persecution of the Byzantine Empire, the

Khazars decided to convert to Judaism since it was the ancestor of both Christianity and Islam and somewhat respected by both religions.

Legend, codified in the great Jewish polemic *Hakuzari* (The Khazar), has it that King Bulan of the Khazars invited a religious leader from each religion to come and profess why he should convert to their religion.[10] After they finished their arguments, King Bulan called in the Christian and Muslim preachers and asked each of them, if they could choose a religion besides their own, which one they would choose. They both replied that they would choose Judaism. The legend says that because of this King Bulan chose to adopt Judaism for his people.[11]

After their conversion, the Khazars held to many laws and customs that Jews still keep today. They kept the Sabbath, Passover, and Hanukah. They performed infant circumcision. They also studied the ancient Judaic texts and even built a tabernacle in resemblance to the one Moses built in the Old Testament.[12] The king of the Khazars invited Jews from around the world to settle in Khazaria, which is very similar to what the current State of Israel does today.

The question that still remains is the extent of the impact the Khazars had on Ashkenazi Jewry. Many opinions seem to state that the Khazar Empire had very little impact on Jewry in Eastern Europe and most of the Jews intermarried within their current culture. Other opinions seem to say that the Ashkenazic Jews have distinct physical features that could only be traced back to the Ancient Khazars. If this theory is true it could prove a major dilemma in Ashkenazi Jewish heritage, as many claim their historic roots are from biblical times.

The Decline of the Khazar Empire

The Khazars only kept Judaism for a couple of centuries; afterward, it wasn't unusual for the Kagan to convert to Islam or Christianity in order to maintain political stability. At the start of the 10th century, the Kievan Rus began to gain

power. The Rus began pillaging and torching Khazar villages, provoking the Khazars to aggression.[13] Eventually, the Rus captured the Khazar capital, Atil, in 967 CE. This was a decisive blow to the Khazar Empire, which soon crumbled. Although the Khazar Empire was defeated, the Rus adopted many of the traditions and laws of the Great Khazar Empire.

Conclusion

The Khazars had a culture like no other and managed to stand on their own against both the Byzantine Empire and the Islamic caliphate. They had a multi-ethnic society that was still able to maintain political stability. The truth or untruth and the extent of the veracity of the theory may seem unimportant, but nothing could be further from the truth, due to the theory of Khazar ancestry sometimes being used for claims alternatively deemed anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist. The Khazars were the first and possibly the last culture to have a whole people convert to Judaism. They have likely made a deep contribution to Ashkenazic Jewry that is rarely discussed. If the claim is true, that in no way makes the Ashkenazi heritage less valuable or somehow tainted; on the contrary, the great respect Judaism accords to converts implies an even greater appreciation for Ashkenazi heritage. Although the Khazars had only a short reign of power in Eastern Europe, their legacy will never be forgotten.

END NOTES

1 Kevin Alan Brook, *The Jews of Khazaria,* Second Ed. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 3.

2 Ibid., 12.

3 Ibid., 50.

4 Ibid., 53.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 64.

7 Ibid., 76.

8   Arthur Koestler, *The Thirteenth Tribe: The Khazar Empire And Its Heritage* (London: Last Century Media, 1976).

9   Ibid.

10   Brook, 94.

11   Ibid.

12   Ibid., 113 and 114.

13   Ibid., 150.